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In this issue of the St Andrews Papers, three excellent articles – each 
based on empirical information collected in interviews with Syrian 
respondents – as well as an internal whitepaper by a presidential 
advisory committee share remarkable insights on the first months of the 
Syrian uprising that begun in March 2011. Though the articles take very 
different perspectives, i.e. on the transnational public space, on an 
individual artist’s divided loyalties as well as a retrospective state-
centred point of view, they all show the inconsistencies and 
contradictions the Syrian political system was afflicted with and which, 
ultimately, were brought to the fore and aggravated by the uprising. 
Carsten Wieland demonstrates at which points of his rule and how 
Bashar al-Asad could have taken a different route down history. 
Wieland’s counterfactual analysis thus emphasizes that there were 
several lost opportunities which became particularly obvious in 
retrospect. For instance, what seemed, at first, like a comeback to the 
international stage, carefully orchestrated by the Syrian regime from the 
2008 onwards, was ‘wasted’ and not translated into corresponding 
domestic political reform. With the advent of the uprising even these 
earlier gains were one-by-one readily given up to a confrontative foreign 
policy. Viewed in this way, the Syrian regime’s inept manoeuvring 
during the first months of the uprising was a continuation of its earlier 
politics of ‘lost chances’. 
Adam Almqvist’s and Helena Nassif’s contributions both 
demonstrate how the Syrian public space developed during the early 
uprising and, by doing so, illuminate the dilemmas and limited room for 
action two particular groups of people faced, cyberactivists and 
internationally-known celebrities. This is particularly interesting since 
both the diaspora and artists are at times perceived as actors who are 
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‘independent’ enough – geographically and intellectually – to formulate 
political demands and, thus, to possibly constitute a democratizing force.  
As Almqvist shows, expatriate cyberactivists have been playing a 
significant role since the beginning of the uprising and they have had a 
clear influence on both the nature of the transnational public sphere and 
on the situation on the ground. Partly mobilizing the protests against al-
Asad’s rule, partly documenting them and spreading them to foreign 
media outlets, they forced the Syrian regime to fight back on the 
transnational public front as well. On the one hand, cyberactivists are 
just one group of several groups of transnational Syrians spurred into 
action by the uprising and confronted with questions of 
representativeness and internal factionalism. On the other hand, even 
though they were unable to turn the tables in favour of the oppositional 
struggle, the uprising has developed a distinct transnational twist 
through them.  
Helena Nassif focuses on the Syrian actress Muna Wassef and her 
publicly made statements and actions during the early days of the 
uprising. Being the mother of exiled activist Ammar Abdulhamid, the 
famous actress sought to use her popularity to rally humanitarian aid for 
the suffering civilian population in Daraa; additionally, her famous role 
as an anti-imperialist heroine in a TV series made protesters project their 
hopes onto her. Yet, as the contribution vividly shows, the al-Asad 
regime continued to have a powerful hand in the entertainment industry, 
and knew how to discredit such calls. The contribution thereby allows 
the drawing of conclusions on Syrian society beyond Mouna Wassef’s 
particular biography. Central bones of contention in the current crisis, 
e.g. the cleavage between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ as well as the fear of 
sectarian strife, can be viewed through her. The first is reflected by 
Wassef’s rootedness in Syria vs. her affection for her oppositionist son 
living abroad; the second was demonstrated by protesters’ creative use 
of her fictional role as a strong Christian woman, thus trying to resist the 
increasingly sectarian nature of the protests. 
Lastly, the memorandum in the annex, prepared in 2010, had been 
commissioned by the Syrian president’s office but later been ignored by 
it. While the short-timed and ineffectual nature of advisory committees 
and their reports was rather common under Bashar al-Asad – their 
recommendations were regularly sought but seldom implemented – the 
frankness and urgency demonstrated by this particular report are 
striking. It shows that ‘insiders’ of the system were well aware of the 
headwinds al-Asad’s politics and, particularly, his polarizing political 
economy faced. Despite due adulation of its recipient, the memorandum 
to the president spells out that “difficulties […] have escalated, by 
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neglect and mismanagement, into a socio-economic crisis” and thus led 
to “a great deal of dissatisfaction among the citizens as well as the elite.” 
For instance, the memorandum points towards the lack of direction and 
clear decision-making, rising poverty and social imbalance, corruption 
and mismanagement and, even, towards the limits of using police, 
security services and the military for controlling social unrest. It 
prefigures the outbreak of the popular uprising less than a year later and, 
notably, it is a far cry from the self-assured public speeches of Bashar 
al-Asad. As late as end-January 2011 he claimed in a, by now infamous, 
interview with the Wall Street Journal that “[i]f you want to talk about 
Tunisia and Egypt, we are outside of this” since he believed himself to 
be “very closely linked to the beliefs of the [Syrian] people”.1 Thus, the 
memorandum presents a highly interesting primary source that not only 
confirms Carsten Wieland’s point that Bashar al-Asad could have taken 
different decisions and possibly even have warded off the uprising, but 
that also demonstrates that the Syrian president was informed by his 
advisors about the most pressing problems and the alternatives available 
to him.  
The different perspectives presented in “The Syrian Uprising: 
Dynamics of an Insurgency” illustrate which structural problems and 
misguided tactics led up to the current crisis and they help to explain the 
downward spiral of brutality that followed in the subsequent months, 
turning the spontaneous popular uprising into a protracted conflict. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The Wall Street Journal, 31.01.2011: “Interview with Syrian President 
Bashar al-Assad”, available from http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
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07.05.2011. 
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Asad’s Decade of Lost Chances1 
Carsten Wieland 
The autocrats who were toppled during the Arab Spring persevered for 
some 30 or 40 years before their power structure imploded. After only a 
decade of rule, the Syrian regime under President Bashar al-Asad seems 
to be nearing its end. The country, its morale and social fabric are in 
ruins. Born in 1965 he is the youngest among the Arab autocrats and 
already politically paralyzed - no matter with which scenario the bloody 
revolt in his country will end. How has this happened after Asad started 
his rule with so much anticipation and high hopes in June 2000? The 
story of his political career is a chain of missed chances and practical 
failures. 
We can assess how far Asad has fallen when we compare to where 
he came from after the death of his father, Hafez. For this purpose I 
would like to quote a passage from my book “Ballots or Bullets?” in 
which I reflected the mood in the streets of Damascus some eight years 
ago:  
Although his nimbus is fading, the young president possesses an image 
that, from the point of view of most Syrians, is neither stained with 
blood nor corrupted by radicalism or incompetence (though some 
would say more the latter than the former). He has successfully been 
able to distance himself from his father’s political Stone Age. Most 
Syrians tend to look for faults in Bashar’s surroundings rather than in 
Bashar himself.2  
After 2011 the president will never be able to revive his former image. 
He has chosen bullets instead of ballots. 
Usually, any assessment of Bashar al-Asad starts with his 
personality, although this approach fails to explain developments in their 
complexity. “Bashar is not the regime”, traditional oppositional figures 
used to reiterate. This was different under Hafez al-Asad. The regime is 
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a complex web of direct or subtle influences, priorities, jealousies and 
power struggles. There are indications that at times Bashar was 
incapable of enacting decisions of his own or even fulfilling given 
promises, because others were calling the shots. A leading and well-
informed oppositional figure said at the end of 2010 that Asad had been 
left to act freely in foreign policy only, whereas domestically the secret 
services, the Baath Party, his clan and big business representatives were 
controlling the sinecure.3  
Without further evidence it is hard to prove if the observations also 
held true a few months later. In light of this thesis it remains an open 
question as to what extent the cruelty of 2011 and 2012 and the 
numerous technical mistakes committed in suppressing the popular 
protests are due to the plurality of power centres in the Syrian polity 
under Asad or if they can be directly attributed to him and his personal 
strategy. Whether he is personally responsible for each and every shot 
that was fired, for each child that was tortured and mutilated, for every 
armed attack of the shabbiha Alawite gangs to incite sectarian hatred, 
for cattle and fields that were burnt to starve dissenting villagers, does 
not really matter in the end. Since 2000 the president has reshuffled 
almost all important positions in the mukhabarat, the military and 
government bureaucracy. He is the president and thus responsible for the 
so-called security solution. The protests triggered typical reflexes of a 
thoroughly authoritarian culture with a cruel history of civil wars and 
crackdowns. Survival is a zero-sum game where the winner takes it all.  
This outcome was far from inevitable as the following pages show. 
Asad had a plethora of opportunities that he missed one by one, 
domestically and internationally. Many Syrians pinned their hopes for 
the young president as a reformer (as their fathers and grandfathers had 
already projected their hopes on Hafez al-Asad as a “liberalizer” and 
“pragmatist” in 1970-1971). From the beginning of his rule in 2000 
Bashar faced a very moderate and intellectual opposition that did not 
pursue the priority of toppling the president but that tried to press for 
incremental change and gradual pluralism. Bashar did not reach out to 
them but launched three major waves of suppression against the 
oppositional Civil Society Movement between 2001 and 2008-2009. The 
noose was tightening around the neck of the opposition despite 
increasing relaxation of international relations from 2008 onwards. Syria 
was by no means on a path of reform when the Arab Spring hit the 
country. Nevertheless, the international community was ready to listen 
to Bashar’s promises and to appreciate the certain stability that he 
embodied until he was rolled over by mass protests from March 2011 
onwards. Bashar led his country into international isolation and 
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traumatic destruction. Stability and secularism, the Asads’ main assets, 
are no more. Asad destroyed his political legacy, his family, his 
religious community, Syria as it used to be and probably himself. The 
decade of his rule is a tragic story because it could have ended so 
differently. 
The Loss of Projected Innocence 
The trained ophthalmologist - often described as western in outlook 
because of his studies in the United Kingdom - differs from the 
stereotype of a brutal dictator. In his youth he is described to have been 
relatively humble, honest, and even “non-ideological”.4 He did not 
display anything similar to the arrogant, dissolute, and excessive life-
styles of the sons of the former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein or 
Libya’s Revolutionary Leader Muammar al-Qaddafi. Asad is no natural 
leader and did not intend to get involved in politics. He had to follow his 
father’s will after the premature death of his elder brother Basil in a car 
accident in 1994. Asad was more interested in the internet and 
computers than in conspiracies and arms. In one of the most sealed off 
countries ruled by the “Sphinx of Damascus”5, his father Hafez al-Asad, 
he became head of the Syrian Computer Society from which he later 
recruited some of his personnel. 
Contrasted with the unscrupulous “security solution” against the 
mostly peaceful street protests of his own people in 2011, the following 
statements of Asad in his inauguration speech a decade earlier appear 
almost surreal:  
I am not after any post nor do I avoid any responsibility. The post is 
not an end but a means to achieve an end. And now, and since my 
people have honored me with their choice of me as president of the 
Republic […] I would like to say that I have assumed the post but I 
have not occupied the position […]. I feel that the man you have 
known […] will not change at all once he assumes his post. He came 
out of the people and lived with them and shall remain one of them. 
You may expect to see him everywhere whether in the work place or 
in the streets or at your picnics in order to learn from you […]. The 
man who has become a president is the same man who was a doctor 
and an officer and first and foremost is a citizen.6  
Indeed, Asad was seen at times in the lanes of old Damascus or Aleppo 
without visible bodyguards and dined in restaurants. 
If assertions of Sheikh Ahmed Badr al-Din Hassoun, the Syrian 
Grand Mufti, reflect the truth, Asad confided in him more than once that 
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in his dreams he would like to return to his profession one day and run 
an eye clinic. This was the first time that a confidant of the president had 
spoken of the possibility of a voluntary and premature end to his rule 
(although the remarkable utterances may have had tactical reasons in the 
tense political situation of November 2011).7 
Indeed, Asad had not been known for his brutality and extravagance 
but for precisely the opposite: his restraint in private matters, 
awkwardness in public appearances, and even political ineptness up to 
the point that during the gravest crisis of his political life the media 
described him as “the dictator who cannot dictate.”8 A member of the 
opposition reported already years ago that some had complained about 
his “weak character.” “He holds the opinion of the person he last spoke 
to,” said an oppositional journalist who preferred to remain anonymous. 
His sister Bushra reportedly called him “stupid and nervous” when he 
allegedly was among a circle of relatives after the turbulent events in 
Lebanon in early 2005.9  
Certainly, Asad has made a plethora of technical and strategic 
mistakes. After a decade of his rule everything pointed to the fact that 
despite his differences, he ended up sharing the other Arab autocrats’ 
cynicism, loss of reality and – contrary to his and Hassoun’s statements 
– an autocrat with an apocalyptic outlook will to cling to power at any 
cost.  
The cynicism is reflected in his readiness to accept an unexpectedly 
high blood toll and to give carte blanche to the security forces and Alawi 
militias. A researcher close to the Syrian opposition said that during the 
uprising Asad calmly explained that his strategy was to get not more 
than 25 to 30 people killed per day, on Fridays maybe more, in order to 
avoid upsetting international public opinion.10 With several thousands of 
people killed since March 2011 as well as tens of thousands arrested and 
held under torture and abysmal conditions in cramped dungeons or sport 
stadiums (estimates from fall 2011 range from 20,000 to 50,000), it is 
possible that the number will equal the toll of the notorious massacre in 
Hama in 1982. The cruelty of tortures, rapes, collective punishment, the 
barring of wounded from treatment, and the cold-bloodedness of civilian 
killings in the streets of Syrian towns that are documented in countless 
amateur videos, despite the technical obstacles and personal risks, 
exceeds what the world had witnessed in the Libyan civil war that led to 
the fall of Qaddafi. Even worse, the displayed degree of atrocities 
against a widely unarmed population is not at all necessary to suppress a 
rebellion. Technically speaking, it is counterproductive. But we will 
come back to bad management and political mistakes during the 
upheaval later in the article. 
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Asad’s increasing loss of reality is well demonstrated in an 
interview that he gave to the Wall Street Journal on January 31. The 
president said that Arab rulers would need to move faster to 
accommodate the rising political and economic aspirations of Arab 
peoples: “If you did not see the need for reform before what happened in 
Egypt and in Tunisia, it is too late to do any reform,” he chided his 
fellow leaders. Then Asad assured the interviewer (and perhaps 
himself):  
We have more difficult circumstances than most of the Arab countries 
but in spite of that Syria is stable. Why? Because you have to be very 
closely linked to the beliefs of the people. This is the core issue. When 
there is divergence between your policy and the people's beliefs and 
interests, you will have this vacuum that creates disturbances. So 
people do not only live on interests; they also live on beliefs, 
especially in very ideological areas. Unless you understand the 
ideological aspect of the region, you cannot understand what is 
happening.  
In the lengthy interview the president also reflected on his people who 
were not yet ready for reform:  
We still have a long way to go because it is a process. If I was brought 
up in different circumstances, I [would] have to train myself and, to be 
realistic, we have to wait for the next generation to bring this reform. 
[…] If you want to be transparent with your people, do not do anything 
cosmetic, whether to deceive your people or to get some applau[se] 
from the West. They want to criticize you, let them criticize and do not 
worry. […] I do not think it is about time [for faster political reform, 
representation of people, and improving human rights], it is about the 
hope, because if I say that in five years’ time or ten years’ time may 
be, if the situation is going to be better, people are patient in our 
region.11 
Not even two months later, the people’s patience ran out and 
confrontations between protesters and security forces across Syria shook 
the Baathist regime more than any challenge since the 1980s. And the 
first public appearance was a smiling president, surrounded by 
parliamentarian claqueurs, who made a surreal speech in the Syrian 
parliament at the end of March. Meanwhile, the Syria known for 
decades had already ceased to exist. The protests have torn asunder the 
delicate fabric of rules, explicit and implicit, that for decades had 
determined the relations between the regime and the citizenry. In the 
end, the nationalistic discourse, the antagonism with Israel and the West 
12    The Syrian Uprising 
in general, and the pro-Palestinian rhetoric did not outweigh the daily 
social and economic grievances, the wish for the end of tutelage, and all 
this combined with the loss of fear after the successful popular uprisings 
in Tunisia and Egypt. The internal enemy overshadowed the external 
one to the surprise of many observers inside and outside Syria. 
Ironically, it was Asad himself who made this form of upheaval 
possible in the first place. He became victim of his own modernization. 
By allowing satellite dishes and by fostering a modern communication 
infrastructure, albeit all in the hands of his clan, he created a modern 
form of protest movement that exchanges videos via YouTube and 
organizes itself via Facebook and SMS. Though several internet sites are 
permanently blocked, Syrians have far more access to information and 
the outside world, through satellite TV, blogs and foreign media. 
Precisely these visible signs of modernization caused hope among many 
young Syrians for further changes and at the same time nurtured the 
yearning for more freedoms when Asad took power. 
The country has indeed made some progress during the ten years of 
Asad’s rule in areas that do not touch upon matters like democracy or 
human rights. Syrian media outlets are more numerous and plainspoken 
than under Hafez, provided that they do not cross red lines related to 
politics, religion and sex. Arts and letters have benefited from more 
freedom of expression. Cell phones and other modern equipment have 
become accessible to a wider range of people. Women’s organizations 
have gained strength and are granted room to maneuver even if they are 
not legally registered or explicitly supportive of the government. 
Clearly, the development of the country under Asad has been an 
asymmetric one. Whereas reforms have become visible especially in the 
macro-economic realm, a stand-still or even reversal can be observed in 
the political, administrative, and socio-economic arenas. After political 
pluralisation seemed too risky the president reduced his aspirations first 
to administrative reforms (anti-corruption, efficiency, etc.), and when 
this was met with resistance, he concentrated on economic reforms that 
have been moving along a bumpy road since then but are indispensable 
for the regime’s survival. 
Internationally speaking, Syria’s development in the past decade has 
taken place in unusually harsh and not entirely predictable conditions. 
The 9/11 attacks in Washington and New York in 2001 changed the 
whole board game in the Middle East and beyond, aggravated by the 
military approach of the US administration under President George W. 
Bush. No democratic experiment was going to be tolerated in Syria as 
US threats of regime change began to emerge in 2002, and the Baathist 
regime entrenched itself in ideological opposition to the Iraq war. 
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Pressure mounted on Syria from abroad, especially from Saudi Arabia, 
France and the United States in subsequent years, culminating in the UN 
Security Council Resolution 1559, calling upon “all remaining foreign 
forces to withdraw from Lebanon.” Asad began to lose his nerve and 
pursued an abrasive policy towards Lebanon. This culminated in the 
assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in February 2005, 
which aggravated Syria’s isolation and entailed the forced withdrawal of 
Syrian troops from Lebanon.  
Asad used to cite these events to justify the delay of domestic 
reforms. “We were affected by the situation in Iraq or in Lebanon. There 
are many things that we wanted to do in 2005 we are planning to do in 
the year 2012, seven years later! It is not realistic to have a time frame 
because you are not living in situation where you can control the 
events”, he said in the WSJ interview at the end of January 2011.12 He is 
definitely right about the fact that the foreign policy environment and 
the approach of some western countries in the region were not at all 
conducive to the opening up of minds and policies in Syria. But despite 
a series of external shocks, many mistakes were homemade. 
Sticking to the Baath Path and a Narrowing Circle of Trust 
The chain of possible chances starts right at the beginning of Asad’s 
rule. The first opportunity to change course occurred when the young 
heir to the republican throne was still highly dependent on the apparatus 
of his father. He could not be sure how supportive the power circles 
would be if he deviated too quickly from the trodden path of Baathism. 
Asad was dependent on key players of the old power structure who 
changed Syria’s constitution to the effect that Asad could become 
president at 34 years instead of the previously necessary 40 years of age. 
Theoretically, however, Asad could have tried to put his legitimacy on a 
wider basis by instituting himself as a transitional president who would 
call for a popular vote. Since there was no other candidate around and 
much less any organized party, he would have won by a landslide.  
But any direct election would have called into question the Baath 
system as a whole that had served his father as a stable basis for three 
decades and enabled the smooth succession. Moreover, competition 
from within the family ranks was still looming. His uncle, Rifat al-Asad 
(who was exiled in 1984 after openly contesting Hafez al-Asad’s rule), 
for example, never really thought that Bashar was the right man for the 
job. He could have taken advantage of any mistake or volatility to snatch 
power himself. Similar ambitions could have emerged in the security 
apparatus or with other major political protagonists like long-time Vice 
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President Abdulhalim Khaddam (who defected in 2005), or Syria’s 
experienced Foreign Minister Farouq al-Shara. 
Asad chose to stick to the Baath path. In reality, however, the Baath 
discourse camouflaged the ideological erosion of the system. There was 
not much left of socialism and neither of pan-Arabism. Asad weakened 
the influence of the Baath Party further during his rule but he never 
questioned the foundations of the system as such. Still, power relations 
have been renegotiated, and Baathist functionaries have been sidelined. 
In times of crisis the circle of persons that the Asad clan can trust has 
been contracting more and more up to the point that if the erosion 
escalates, it may become difficult to recruit enough staunch and 
qualified loyalists to effectively run the country.  
In the years leading to the crisis, the circle of trust had been 
narrowing. The regime developed increasingly primordial features; it 
has become more Alawi compared to Hafez’s times.13 Interestingly, the 
second layer of regime functionaries after the Alawi avant-garde is 
composed of personalities from the Houran (especially Dera’a), 
including the Vice President and longtime foreign minister, Farouq al-
Shara, who is a Sunni. Given the cruel events in Dera’a, this second 
layer of functionaries in the regime apparatus may prove less reliable in 
the future. Shara is still a man of the regime without any doubt, but he is 
rumoured to have had a difference of opinion with Bashar and especially 
Maher al-Asad on the crackdown in Dera’a. The communiqué of the 
foreign Syrian opposition after their conference in the Turkish city of 
Antalya in June called for handing over power to the vice president. 
Louay Hussein, secular editor and leading figure of Syria’s domestic 
opposition, shed light on the differences of Bashar and Hafez al-Asad’s 
regimes in a conversation in October 2010. According to Hussein, the 
father was able to build his legitimacy on two pillars: social 
development and the liberation of occupied territories (or at least the 
attempt to do so). He had the power to control the Islamists and was 
ready to fight. “Bashar was handed power on a silver plate”, Hussein 
said. He has been lacking the two pillars of his father. The younger 
group had “no knowledge and vision of the state’s identity. They are 
playing around. They don’t know what losing means because they didn’t 
fight for anything and didn’t face any real challenges.”14 The moment to 
fight came unexpectedly, and it turned out that the system was 
exclusively based on hard power, i.e. on the extinction of dissenters and 
threats.15  
Asad’s Decade of Lost Chances   15 
Crushing the Damascus Spring: The Failure of National 
Reconciliation 
A second opportunity to pursue sweeping changes was to come soon 
after Asad’s assumption of power. In his inaugural speech he called for 
Syrians to actively contribute to shaping the country’s future.16 
Intellectuals were inspired and began to discuss more and more freely in 
the newly-found debating clubs in the halls of private houses. The 
dynamics that emerged thereof in September 2000 became known as the 
Damascus Spring. That fall, the Christian writer Michel Kilo headlined a 
group of intellectuals who published the “manifesto of the 99,” followed 
in December by the “manifesto of the 1,000.” The secular philosopher, 
Sadiq al-Azm, was one of the key signatories. Riad Seif, an entrepreneur 
and outspoken Member of Parliament, went the furthest, putting forward 
social-democratic ideals of a “fair market economy” that he upheld with 
decent labor practices in the companies he owned. Politically, he called 
for a constitutional state, an independent legislature and courts, and a 
free press. But Seif crossed a red line when he announced his intention 
to found a party of his own. He was arrested, and the Damascus Spring 
turned cold as the debating clubs in Damascus had to close down one 
after the other.  
Had the Syrians listened more carefully to Asad’s inaugural speech, 
they may have anticipated that it was modernization that was on the new 
president’s agenda but not sweeping political reforms or even 
democracy. In this speech in June 2000, Asad had made his position 
clear.  
We cannot apply the democracy of others to ourselves. Western 
democracy, for example, is the outcome of a long history that resulted 
in customs and traditions, which distinguish the current culture of 
Western societies. […] We have to have our democratic experience 
which is special to us, which stems from our history, culture, 
civilization, and which is a response to the needs of our society and the 
requirements of our reality.17  
Simply, this meant that the Baath Party was to retain political leadership. 
In reply to questions about political reform, the president later answered 
with stilted formulations such as: “We need an intellectual basis. There 
should be a connection between the political proposal and the social 
structure in society.”18 And the latter, he implied, was not yet mature 
enough to enable the population to participate in politics as in a 
Western-style democracy. These are the very same thoughts that he 
reiterated in the interview with the WSJ in January 2011. 
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At the very beginning of his rule Asad plugged into the notorious 
discourse of other Arab autocrats in the region: Their people were not 
ready for democracy, and democracy was a “cultural phenomenon” of 
the west. In the Arab Spring of 2011 the people finally showed that, 
indeed, they were ready not only for practical changes but also for a new 
political discourse and even political culture. People demonstrated that it 
was their rulers who were responsible for keeping them in a state of 
poverty and intended political immaturity. 
Although the mostly elderly protagonists of the Civil Society 
Movement oscillated ideological ideas sometimes aloof from the 
discourse of the younger people, the far-sightedness and intellectual 
maturity of the Syrian opposition’s discourse became clear unexpectedly 
ten years after the suffocation of the Damascus Spring. Sadiq al-Azm 
draws a parallel between the Arab Spring of 2011 and the Damascus 
Spring of 2001:  
The Charter of 99 contained all the slogans, demands and aspirations 
wherever there is an intifada now. The Damascus Spring created the 
first documents that emphasized freedom, democracy, human rights, 
civil society and so on, and avoided the typical attacks on Israel. The 
Damascus Spring was a dress rehearsal of the Arab Spring.  
The philosopher, who lives in Beirut now, observes a maturation of 
Arab society during the upheavals: “It was the regimes that represented 
themselves as representatives of enlightenment and state rationalism, 
and suddenly they clung to conspiracy theories and kept repeating them 
mindlessly, not the simple masses who had always been blamed for 
falling prey to conspiracies.”19  
Despite his young age Bashar al-Asad did not distinguish himself 
from his elder counterparts. He rather tried to follow the Chinese 
example: economic liberalization without, or with only minor, political 
reforms at home — or bread before freedom, as expressed by Riad 
Seif.20 It took many Syrians and observers of Syria a long time to realize 
that, in the end, Asad was aiming at bread instead of freedom.  
The clampdown of the Damascus Spring in 2001 was the first wave 
of suppression against the moderate Syrian opposition. Asad decided to 
prioritize regime stability before democratic experiments. This was a 
conscious step to secure his power after he felt he would lose control. 
The then Vice-president Abdulhalim Khaddam was instrumental in 
putting the brakes on the development, and the Civil Society Movement 
went underground - in the Syrian context more appropriately put: into 
the tea houses. Café Rawda was the most popular meeting point right 
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around the corner of the parliament building. For the next couple of 
years the regime and the leftist intellectual opposition were to coexist 
side by side in a peculiar and very Syrian manner with protagonists of 
the Civil Society Movement taking turns in prison. 
There was a time when even parts of the regime seemed to 
appreciate the constructive and prudent nature of Syria’s opposition. 
Bahjat Suleiman, the feared and powerful former head of Syrian 
intelligence, wrote in the Lebanese newspaper al-Safir in 2003, “In 
Syria, the regime does not have enemies but ‘opponents’ whose 
demands do not go beyond certain political and economic reforms, such 
as the end of the state of emergency and martial law; the adoption of a 
law on political parties; and the equitable redistribution of national 
wealth.”21 Forcible regime change, Suleiman knew, was only on the 
agenda of select exiles and US politicians.  
But instead of reaching out to these opponents, who defined a 
gradual transition toward civil society and pluralism as a soft landing 
within the system and who shared basic foreign-policy assumptions of 
the Baathists, the president treated these intellectuals like a gang of 
criminals in subsequent years. Thus he disillusioned many Syrians who 
had hoped for a common ground towards incremental change. Looking 
back at Asad’s first big opportunity, al-Azm says: “Asad should have 
brought Riad Seif into a reshuffled government in 2001. His original sin 
was not to have offered national reconciliation. Many even said that he 
would have been ready to reconcile with Israel but not with his own 
people.”22 
With remarkable foresight, Michel Kilo stated in 2003 that the 
Syrian regime was not reformable. This was true for all authoritarian 
regimes in the Arab world. “They are not in a situation of stability but in 
a stable crisis,” said Kilo. “When the regime in the Soviet Union wanted 
to reform itself, the regime was gone. It will happen the same way with 
the regimes in the Arab world. This is part of the drama of these 
regimes.”23 Thus, Asad resisted any pressure for real political reform. 
While others still projected hope in the president, Kilo was without 
illusions. “Bashar has allied himself with the corrupt forces. Thus he has 
basically renounced reform. […] Bashar is not only unable to act, he 
does not want to act either.” The president, he lamented, wanted to 
circumvent the issue of democracy. “He only wants a reform of power, 
not of the system.” Another leading member of the Civil Society 
Movement, who preferred to remain anonymous, came to a similar 
conclusion: “Bashar is aware of his weaknesses.” For this reason he is 
largely keeping out of domestic politics and has abandoned his 
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originally ambitious reform program. “He has capitulated to the 
hardliners and opted for stability instead of progress.” 
Suleiman’s distinction between opponents and enemies was to 
become highly topical again in the 2011 upheavals, however, in a much 
more polarized setting. It is part of the Syrian tragedy that even after the 
bloody escalation in 2011 some oppositional figures tried to keep the 
doors open in the hope of dialogue for the sake of Syria’s stability and in 
order to avoid a civil war, most notably Kilo himself. Ignoring the 
constructive opposition has been one of Asad’s gravest errors of his 
tenure. A decade later, the days were over when obstreperousness was 
defined as discussion in the back rooms of teahouses suffused with the 
aromatic smoke of water pipes. The Syrian president learned to face a 
new and young opposition in the streets and the whiff of gunpowder.  
External Shocks Exacerbate the Domestic Situation 
The clampdown on the Damascus Spring took place when the young 
Asad was still in a phase of orientation. External shocks were soon to hit 
the region and the Syrian regime that were beyond its control. But the 
Damascus Spring was strangled before the first external shocks 
occurred, which were the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in 
Washington and New York. After 9/11 and in the “war against 
terrorism” the Arab autocrats received a new pretext to get tough on 
oppositional figures (many of whom were located in the Islamist 
spectrum outside Syria) and a new context in which to frame their 
policies. 
9/11 yielded a double-edged sword for Damascus. On the one hand, 
the events opened an opportunity for the Syrian mukhabarat to employ 
their year-long experience in the fight against Islamists of all kinds. 
Moreover, it represented a point of contact with western interests and 
was a welcome opportunity to underline the secular credentials of the 
Baath regime. Indeed, Syria was a valuable partner for the West in the 
fight against Islamist terrorists. It was no coincidence that the security 
establishments both in the United States and Israel used to take more 
conciliatory positions vis-à-vis Damascus than the respective political 
establishments. For example, George Tenet, who resigned from his 
position as head of the CIA, was, with his organization, one of the few 
moderating voices with regard to the Syrian regime within the US 
administration of George W. Bush. 
On the other hand, despite Syria’s willing cooperation in the fight 
against Islamist terrorism, it did not succeed in trading in this 
commitment for substantially better relations with the United States or 
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Europe. Such a development would have given a boost to the section of 
the technocratic and political elite in Damascus that was westward-
looking and pragmatic. Some of them lobbied for a rapprochement 
between Syria and Europe and favoured the signing of the long-
postponed EU Association Agreement. One of the key representatives 
was Sami Khiamy, Asad’s economic adviser who later became the 
Syrian ambassador to London. 
The problem for Syria was that two political types of discourses 
were simultaneously active on the international stage particularly in 
Washington. One was the discourse oscillating around the fight against 
Islamist terrorism, which included the debate over direct consequences 
from the 9/11 attacks. It also went further and posed fundamental 
questions about a readjustment and the value-orientation of western 
foreign-policy vis-à-vis so-called pro-Western regimes that had nurtured 
Islamist terrorism for years, above all Saudi Arabia.24 If this discourse 
had been seriously pursued, Syria could have gained strategic advantage 
on the security level in view of its contribution against militant Islamism 
(much less, obviously, on the level of democratic governance).  
The second discourse had less to do with protecting the United 
States from terrorist threats but with catering for Israel’s security 
concerns in the region. The pro-Israel discourse did not always overlap 
with the anti-Islamist-terrorism discourse. In this frame Saddam 
Hussein’s Iraq posed a threat to Israel and thus became a target of the 
Israel-friendly neo-conservative foreign-policy of the Bush 
administration. Already at that time also western governments such as 
France and Germany were not convinced that Iraq had something to do 
with al-Qaida (and chemical weapons) and opposed an attack on the 
basis of these reasons.  
What it meant for Syria was that the pro-Israel discourse proved 
stronger and in the end impaired efforts undertaken within the anti-
Islamist-terrorism discourse. Because Syria has a political, ideological 
and territorial problem with Israel, it was never a candidate to enter into 
a pro-Western camp under the influence of the Bush administration and 
Israeli interests. Nevertheless, Syria did continue to cooperate with 
western secret services even after the Anglo-American attack on Iraq up 
to the fall of 2003. When the regime in Damascus did not harvest any 
rewards from its engagement, but threats of regime change instead, it 
was not interested in further cooperation.  
This time it was the West that had missed a great chance. Instead of 
placing Syria within the “extended axis of evil” and of pushing it into 
the arms of Iran - which many Syrians detest culturally, ideologically 
and religiously – there was a window of opportunity to focus on 
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common secular values and the tolerance of religious minorities, on the 
fight against militant Islamism. Perhaps there was even a chance to 
embark on technical forms of Syrian-European cooperation such as the 
Association Agreement. This would have strengthened the pro-western 
actors within the Syrian bureaucracy and political elite. It would have 
resonated among parts of the educated middle class as well. Around this 
time blue car stickers with yellow stars became popular in Damascus 
that served to imitate EU number plates. Instead, secularist Syria began 
drifting more and more into the Iranian orbit and into alliances with 
Islamist groups. 
Ideological Encrustation in Context of the Iraq War 
The Iraq war was definitely the worst external shock to which the Asad 
government was exposed. The regime was not ready to embark on 
democratic experiments as long as its neighbourhood was violent and 
while the regime’s survival was openly put into question by 
Washington. In turn, this situation represented a comfortable excuse for 
the regime not to enact any political reforms and to suppress the 
domestic opposition further. 
The Iraq war presented a further opportunity for Asad to 
demonstrate whether or not he had the political shrewdness of his father. 
On the one hand, he used the situation very well to galvanize Syrian 
public opinion and to rally the whole “Arab street” behind him. Asad 
became a hero from Baghdad to Casablanca as the only Arab leader who 
confronted a belligerent Bush administration. He even enjoyed the 
company of European countries like Germany and France in the anti-
war camp. But it was Syria alone that raised the flag of anti-imperialist 
pan-Arabism again. The resistance discourse resonated well and Asad 
enjoyed a time of almost unanimous domestic support. In this matter he 
could be sure to have great parts of the Syrian opposition behind him. 
On another note Syria became the hub for Arab resistance fighters who 
trickled into Iraq. The regime in Damascus was content to get rid of 
Syrian Islamists who crossed over to Iraq where the Americans even did 
the job of killing them. Furthermore, the Islamists distracted the 
Americans from leaving Iraq prematurely and from choosing Damascus 
as their next target for regime change. An attack on Syria had been a 
realistic scenario in the first months after the Iraq invasion. 
Syria’s rejection of military intervention in Iraq was definitely 
understandable. Raymond Hinnebusch interprets Syria’s stance in terms 
of an ideological rationale: “Opposition to the US was a collective 
decision that would have been taken by any nationalist leadership in 
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Damascus. Not only did the invasion threaten vital Syrian interests in 
Iraq, but it was also an egregious affront to the Arab nationalist values 
so ingrained in Syrian thinking.” After all, the invasion of Iraq was in 
Israel’s best interest.25 
Against this background of domestic and regional popularity, there 
is certainly debate as to whether Asad’s actions were politically useful in 
the long run. Discussions with Syrian intellectuals at that time indicated 
that Asad could have reacted to the Iraq war with more political 
foresightedness and less ideological fervor. In search of a direction for 
his foreign policy, Asad used the Anglo-American attack on Syria’s 
neighbor to revive pan-Arab rhetoric. People in tea houses wondered 
how Hafez al-Asad would have acted in this situation. Some considered 
the young Asad’s policy to be even more ideological than his father’s in 
this respect. For in the end most Syrians were glad that Saddam was 
overthrown, the Syrian Baathist establishment included.26 Why should 
Syria have suddenly lent support to the Iraqi dictator, its Baathist 
archrival? Michel Kilo is convinced that “Hafez al-Asad would have 
avoided the conflict with the United States.”27  
It is hard to say whether Asad is really more ideological than his 
father. He may be less intellectually flexible and less politically shrewd 
by changing sides whenever it looked opportune. The young Asad’s 
ideological hard-line position on the Iraq issue was part of a search for 
political orientation, a learning process concerning foreign policy rather 
than an entrenched ideology. It is scarcely surprising that it was the 
Baath cadres in particular that were said to have advised Bashar to adopt 
such a strict pro-Iraq and anti-American position. For them it was a 
welcome opportunity to begin to replenish the empty reservoir of the 
Baath ideology at a time when they were otherwise running out of 
answers.  
Previously, the best export product Syria had was its foreign policy, 
as Syrian analyst Samir Altaqi puts it.28 Hafez al-Asad used to secure 
sources of money and room for political maneuver. Syria received 
money from the Arab states in 1967 because it was engaged in a war 
with Israel, again in 1973, and once more in 1976 when Syrian troops 
intervened in the civil war in Lebanon. Then, in 1982, Syria was given 
support when Israel invaded Lebanon and occupied the southern part of 
the country. At the same time, Asad secured extensive debt relief from 
the Soviet Union in exchange for approving the Russian invasion of 
Afghanistan. In the Gulf War in 1991, Hafez al-Asad did a U-turn and 
accepted financial aid from the Gulf States, primarily Kuwait, as thanks 
for supporting the coalition troops against Iraq. Finally, in another U-
turn, money flowed from Baghdad after an unexpected honeymoon with 
22    The Syrian Uprising 
the Saddam regime after 1997, and especially after Hafez al-Asad’s 
death.  
Applied to the Iraq scenario in 2003 this means that Syria would 
have naturally rejected the Anglo-American invasion. But the way in 
which Asad surfed on the wave of anti-Western, pan-Arab nationalism - 
that notably merged with staunchly Islamist discourses - did not leave 
much leeway for a future change of tactics. Moreover, this served as a 
catalyst for Syria to close ranks with Iran, a process that had started with 
Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982. In the wider political scenario the 
Syrian regime has always been aware of the necessity of US support for 
any major achievement in the region, if only for the famous last mile in 
a possible peace agreement with Israel. Many of Asad’s foreign policy 
endeavours after the Iraq war were indeed directed towards finding 
some kind of acceptance in Washington, hence antagonizing it was 
impolitic.  
Meanwhile in 2011, Syria’s foreign policy options have narrowed 
down to alliances with, roughly speaking, Iran, Russia, China and 
Venezuela. Apparently, family members of higher regime loyalists did 
not see other options once the uprising began than fleeing to countries 
such as Malaysia, Iran, the UAE, China, Ghana, and Nigeria.29 On a 
political level the newest trend is East Asia, as Syria’s foreign minister 
Walid Muallem announced in anti-Western anger at the end of October 
2011 in front of a group of Indian academics and journalists.30 President 
Asad underlined this when talking to a Russian TV station. Interestingly, 
in this interview Asad backdated the decision to look to the Far East to 
the year 2005, precisely at the moment when an economic reform 
programme was announced in the Five Year Plan and the European 
model of Social Market Economy was declared, on paper.31 
The Unresolved Kurdish Question 
Domestically, Asad missed an important chance during and after the 
violent Kurdish protests in March 2004, a failure that is likely to close in 
on him, too. This was one of numerous unresolved problems that 
cumulatively rebounded on Asad in 2011. 
In 2004, bands of Kurdish demonstrators rioted in several cities, 
including Aleppo and Damascus, setting fire to cars and fighting battles 
with the security police. But within a week Asad had the situation under 
control. The riots were sparked during a soccer match but the causes lay 
deeper. The Syrian Kurds have a score to settle with the Syrian regime. 
A Syrian population census in 1962 ignored about ninety thousand 
Kurds in order to stop the demographic balance in the north tilting 
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toward the Arabs’ disadvantage. As a countermeasure, the Baath regime 
tried to settle Arabs in a belt along the Turkish border. An estimated two 
to three hundred thousand Kurds were without citizenship, including 
descendants. They were not allowed to travel or to own land, among 
other things. Today a total of one-and-a-half to two million Kurds live in 
Syria.  
Two aspects are interesting here. First, the moderate opposition 
from the Civil Society Movement, in particular the human rights lawyer 
Anwar al-Bounni, tried to mediate and exert a moderating influence on 
Kurdish activists. It was against the patriotism of the Syrian opposition 
to allow any form of Arab-Kurdish cleavage. Kurdish political leaders 
who agreed to avoid a rift between them and the Arab oppositional 
counterparts conceded that they had lost control over parts of their 
constituency. This would have been yet another opportunity for the 
regime to reach out to the opposition on behalf of the common national 
interest in times of external turbulences such as in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
Secondly, after the riots Asad travelled to the neglected Kurdish 
region in northwestern Syria and promised to look into the issue of 
Kurdish grievances. The years passed without any reforms. Rules 
against Kurds were even tightened, particularly in the field of 
purchasing property. It was only under the existential threat of the mass 
protests of 2011 that the president - as one of the first measures - 
announced a grant of citizenship to stateless elements of the Kurdish 
population. Thus he intended to prevent a strong Kurdish participation in 
the protest movements. However, at this point this was no longer 
received as a welcome reform but considered as a half-hearted 
concession at the last minute. Thus it lost its political effect like so many 
other last-minute concessions that Asad announced in the wake of the 
street riots in spring and summer 2011. The Kurdish issue was one of 
the easiest concessions to make. Asad lacked the political instinct to 
launch a solution at the right moment. 
Asad’s Critical Half-time 
During the military intervention in Iraq and the danger this involved for 
Syria’s national security, Asad had the Syrian population staunchly 
behind him. As mentioned above, anti-Americanism helped to revive the 
skeleton of Pan-Arabism as an antipode, this time with a more Islamic 
flavor. The Civil Society Movement simmered after 2003, while 
economic reforms started to bear initial fruits of visible day-to-day 
improvement, especially in the banking system. 
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In this sense the Iraq war as an external shock bore positive 
potential for Asad. He could have used it once again to strengthen his 
legitimacy with a popular vote. But he did not. The predicament of 
reforming without destroying was not resolved. Former and frustrated 
Baath member Ayman Abdul Nour who has known Asad since his youth 
said in 2004 in a quite realistic assessment: “If there were free elections 
controlled by the UN, the president would be sure to win. But if he did 
this, he would admit that the past thirty years were illegitimate.” This is 
an ideological dead-end. Nour conceded that if there were free 
parliamentary elections with new parties, the percentage of Baath Party 
members in parliament would be certain to slide to below 50 percent.32  
So it was Asad as a person who continued to have a wide social base 
- especially within Syria’s Alawite, Christian, Druze, and Ismaili 
minorities as well as the moderate Sunni merchant class - but he decided 
to remain attached to the encrusted Baath structure and within reach of 
the vested interests of his clan. The role game was well distributed 
among the leading family members. Asad remained the friendly face to 
the outside world, his brother Maher and his brother-in-law Asef 
Shawkat were responsible for the elite soldiers of the presidential guard 
and the mukhabarat, and cousin Rami Makhlouf with his commercial 
monopolies amassed riches from all kinds of businesses in Syria to 
secure the clan’s finances.  
Reference to the “old guard” of functionaries from Hafez al-Asad’s 
times initially served as an argument not to embark on political change 
beyond administrative adjustments and insulated economic reforms. 
However, the picture was more complex. Old-aged functionaries were 
not necessarily part of the “old guard”, and young ones not necessarily 
reformers and westward looking. Gradually, Asad placed his people in 
the key political and security positions, so that the argument of the “old 
guard” became less and less tenable.33 Since mid-2004, observers 
concluded that Bashar was finally able to consolidate his position within 
the regime machinery. In July of 2004, he got rid of the long-serving 
military Chief of Staff Hikmat Shihabi and replaced four-hundred-and-
fifty army officers (during the existential threat of the 2011 upheavals, 
some of these figures were reactivated since Asad was in desperate need 
of their military experience).  
Precisely at this half-time of his rule, when Asad felt relatively 
secure, he committed one grievous error and missed another formidable 
chance.  
The error was to press for an unconstitutional extension of 
Lebanon’s pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud at any cost. Asad took a 
personal decision against the advice of the experienced Vice President 
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Abdul Halim Khaddam and the Baath Regional Command. After the 
extension of Lahoud’s term on 2 September 2004, the UN Security 
Council, led by a remarkable coalition of the United States and France, 
passed Resolution 1559. Although it did not name Syria directly, the 
resolution was a clear challenge to Damascus, calling for the withdrawal 
of foreign troops from Lebanon, for the disarmament of militias (which 
meant, above all, Hezbollah), and for free and fair elections the 
following May.  
The insistence on violating Lebanon’s constitution and of 
prolonging Lahoud’s presidency bore heavy long-term costs for the 
Syrian regime. Among other repercussions Syria lost France as a 
benevolent partner in Europe. It had been France’s President Jacques 
Chirac who was the only western statesman to attend Hafez al-Asad’s 
funeral in June 2000. In subsequent years French consultants poured into 
Damascus to help Syria to reform its administrative and judicial system. 
Now it was the personal friendship between Lebanon’s Prime Minister 
Rafiq Hariri and Chirac that proved stronger. Syria was isolated. Not a 
single Arab state moved a finger in support. 
In the following months, the resolution became the main tool for 
pressuring Syria to withdraw its troops from Lebanon. It also served to 
considerably narrow Syria’s room for political maneuver. Asad had a 
personal fall-out with Hariri and created an aggressive anti-Hariri 
atmosphere. So fingers immediately pointed to the regime in Damascus 
and to Hezbollah after Hariri was assassinated by a huge car bomb in 
downtown Beirut on 14 February 2005. A wave of anti-Syrian protests 
swept Lebanon, and Asad humbly had to announce the withdrawal of 
Syrian troops from Lebanon. Subsequently, the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon, whose role was to investigate the Hariri assassination, became 
yet another political instrument for Syria’s enemies to put pressure on 
Damascus. 
During these months rumours spread of a coup d’état in the 
presidential palace in Damascus. Regime loyalists debated whether Asad 
was capable at all of defending Syria’s national interests. Asad’s power 
became challenged as never before. Only in 2011 was a similar 
discussion again sparked, this time involving much higher stakes. Asad 
has piled up political debts from his family clan and the Alawi security 
establishment. Earlier missed chances began to take their toll. Without 
having risked a popular vote or at least reached out for national 
reconciliation with the moderate opposition Asad had nothing much but 
his clan and the security apparatus to fall back on. This has made the 
president sink ever deeper into the self-interested power structure up to 
the point of no return. The political blunder of the Hariri assassination, 
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whoever was behind it, marked the beginning of the decline of Asad. 
The trauma of complete isolation created a certain paranoia also with 
regard to domestic challenges. 
Despite the foreign policy disaster in the beginning of the year 2005 
the subsequent months yielded a valuable opportunity for Asad to 
reposition himself domestically. In June of that year Asad called the 10th 
Regional Baath Congress, the first one under his leadership. 
Expectations were high. But oppositional forces and foreign observers 
were disappointed because they had expected more sweeping political 
reforms, the end of martial law, immediate permission for the creation of 
independent parties, reform of the judiciary, and the abolition of the 
Baath monopoly, as well as the release of the key opposition figures of 
the Damascus Spring. Instead, the results were merely announcements 
that never took effect until the regime struggled for survival in 2011.  
In the five-year-plan under the auspices of Abdulla al-Dardari, 
Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, the term Social Market 
Economy was adopted. Dardari was active in opening Syria’s economy 
while trying to limit social shocks. The technocrat gained credibility 
abroad and with foreign experts who were invited to support the 
government in this effort, mostly Germans and French. Hopeful signs of 
economic development blended with worries of an increasing social 
disequilibrium.  
Some progress was achieved between 2005 and 2011. The 
investment environment was improved. Clearer rules were established 
and a competition law against monopolies was initiated, be they state 
owned or private. Import bans were lifted and the state further 
relinquished its monopoly on imports. Syria had already opened its 
market by signing the GAFTA (Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement) in 
1997, and bilaterally to Iran, Iraq and, most significantly, to Turkey. The 
Central Bank was granted more autonomy in monetary policies, and a 
private banking sector was established. A stock exchange was founded 
and real estate laws relaxed. A sales tax was introduced and older taxes 
abolished. Foreign debts were comparatively low and foreign money 
reserves high (more than 60% of GDP). As a result, economic 
performance improved and foreign investment steadily grew. After 
Lebanon became more volatile again in 2006 many tourists and 
investors from the Gulf States went over to Syria. Tourism boomed. All 
these positive developments delivered a financial buffer for the 
government when the Arab Spring revolts paralyzed the Syrian 
economy. Among other things the government profited from a high 
amount of foreign currency reserves that it could then use to finance the 
crackdown. 
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However, already a few years later it became clear that Asad’s 
government was about to give away a socio-economic opportunity after 
the country’s painful emergence from a socialist command economy. 
Instead of serious attempts to implement the ambitious concept of a 
Social Market Economy in a coherent way, economic reforms stopped 
short at the point where they would have hurt the wider clan’s vested 
interests and privileges. Not even a strategy paper existed that defined a 
Social Market Economy in the Syrian context.34 
The dynamics of economic reform had started to fade before the 
Arab Spring set in. A foreign expert who worked with the government 
referred to the concept of Social Market Economy at the end of 2010 
with the following remark: “I think two or three years ago one was more 
ambitious than today.” Conservative forces realized that their vested 
political or business interests were in danger if reform got serious, and 
they started obstructing. In particular, the Minister of Finance and the 
Planning Commission were dragging their feet. Apart from that the 
foreign expert criticized a series of contradicting and technically flawed 
public policies.35 
Another foreign expert asked why the Social Market Economy in 
Syria had one face only, namely Darari himself. It was because thus it 
was easier to abandon and go on with business as usual whenever 
necessary without even making the attempt to please western discourses. 
This is precisely what happened at the beginning of 2011 just before the 
protests started to gain momentum. Dardari was kicked out of the 
government.  
The chronology is important because it means that this reform 
concept was meant to fail before widespread protests caused the need for 
pure crisis management. The term Social Market Economy did not find 
its way into the next five-year-plan, and with the violence that erupted, 
the Syrian economy and whatever was left of an economic reform 
process lay in tatters. 
The reform announcements of the 10th Baath Congress of 2005, 
however, had at least served as a yardstick for the opposition’s demands. 
Of particular importance were the party law, the lifting of the state of 
emergency, and the separation of party and government. The 
announcement to fight corruption provoked hopes, too, but was not in 
any case more sincere than the other declarations. For Asad himself the 
most important outcome of the Baath Congress was a thorough 
reshuffling of top positions in the National Command and the Central 
Committee of the party, the government, and the military, consolidating 
his power. 
28    The Syrian Uprising 
The Second Wave of Repression 
Instead of working toward the fulfilment of the reform promises, a 
second clampdown on the Syrian Civil Society Movement was soon to 
follow. In face of the obvious vulnerability of Asad’s regime due to the 
Hariri assassination, the secular opposition gained momentum and was 
encouraged by western diplomats and politicians. At that time a historic 
step toward a more unified opposition was achieved through the 
Damascus Declaration of 16 October 2005. For the first time, all major 
opposition groups - reaching from the secular Civil Society Movement 
to Kurdish activists, moderate Muslims, and even the outlawed Muslim 
Brotherhood in London - issued a broad call for democratic change in 
Syria. Michel Kilo as the head of the Civil Society Movement composed 
the original draft before it underwent a lengthy process of discussion 
among the different groups.  
A wave of suppression followed suit in the first half of 2006 when 
those who had been spared in 2001 were arrested like Kilo and human 
rights lawyer Anwar al-Bounni. The hunt for signatories of the 
Damascus Declaration was linked to the accusation of pursuing the 
agenda of western interests while the Syrian regime suffered from the 
“Lebanon trauma” of increased isolation and stigmatization. In this 
respect the suppression of civil society went hand in hand with external 
developments. 
Soon after Kilo was arrested in May 2006 the summer war between 
Israel and Hezbollah broke out. Its result was a public diplomacy 
disaster for Israel, although the human and material damage on the 
Lebanese side was far higher. This war offered Asad yet another 
opportunity. After Hezbollah declared “victory”, Asad in a rather 
dogmatic speech tried to cash in on the triumph as part as his own 
policies of resistance against Israel. Syrian public opinion stood behind 
him, while Hezbollah and to some extent Asad became the heroes of the 
Arab street far beyond the Levant. 
In this way Asad could orchestrate the due presidential and 
parliamentary “elections” in Syria in 2007 with a comfortable cushion of 
popularity. Syrians were proud of their president who had resisted 
international sanctions, the US intervention in Iraq and international 
pressures connected with the Hariri tribunal; he was the only Arab 
leader left who dared to speak out against Israel. With the main 
protagonists of the Civil Society Movement behind bars and the street 
behind him, this would have been another apt moment to formalize his 
popular support within reformed political structures. Instead, Asad chose 
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to be acclaimed again by manipulated referendum (or “election” as it 
was officially called) for another seven-year-tenure.  
On the public policy level, the selective economic reforms started to 
hurt the poor and the lower middle classes while corruption and 
mismanagement thrived. Kilo asserted in late 2010 that transition in 
Syria toward a post-Baath era was achieved by an alliance of the 
mukhabarat with the new rich.36  
One aspect of the domestic climate in Syria was that single issue 
groups with new forms of organization started to replace the old Civil 
Society Movement as the main actors of change from below. The 
secular and intellectual civil society activists had pursued a holistic 
approach of society and politics including conceptions of an ideological 
überbau, did not shy away from delicate issues such as political 
pluralism and democracy, and posed demands of domestic and foreign-
policy relevance.  
The new single issue movements did not deal with these dangerous 
and sometimes unwieldy aspects but focused on immediate priorities 
such as women’s rights, the fight against honour killings or the 
opposition against the planned reform of the Personal Status Law. As 
long as they did not mention democracy and did not criticize the 
President, these local NGOs seemed to enjoy a greater amount of 
tolerance. Given the practical defeat of the Civil Society Movement by 
2010 and the taboo surrounding the notion of civil society, the regime 
made efforts to re-appropriate the term for itself.  
Civil society in Syria – as it became frequently used by the 
government and international donors and agencies – is not the civil 
society as understood in the historical context of Europe in the sense of 
an enlightened, self-determined, critical and politically active 
bourgeoisie or societé des citoyens. This is what the Civil Society 
Movement had in mind when they founded the debating clubs during the 
Damascus Spring. Accordingly, Kilo defines civil society as “a society 
of free citizens, exclusively defined by their freedom, independently of 
any objective ascriptions such as religion or ethnicity.”37 
Syria’s First Lady Asma al-Asad put herself at the forefront of “civil 
society” development in the government’s formal sense of “non-
government” organizations that work on the grass root level but with 
clear restrictions. Freedom was clearly not part of this definition of 
citizenship. In 2007 the First Lady formed an umbrella for the NGOs in 
Syria called the Syria Trust for Development. Those civil society 
activities were given access to shared resources, research and 
administrative services, and at the same time were restricted to the red 
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lines of the regime because there was no legal activity outside this 
realm.  
This was part of a strategy to enhance the Syrian image abroad by 
plugging into a widely accepted international discourse. It also served 
the purpose of repairing distortions of unequal economic development 
and employing NGOs in a buffer function against socio-economic 
shocks. Syria Trust was certainly also a tool in the power struggle 
between conservative ideologues and reformists, an attempt to gain the 
upper hand and create incremental action, looking possibly to 
incremental change. Finally, it was an attempt to fill the vacuum against 
potential Islamic charities. 
In a bitter irony, considering the clampdown on the Damascus 
Spring, the Syrian Government’s Five Year Plan (2006-2010) addressed 
the limited role of civil society in Syria’s development. Recognizing that 
“the role of the civil associations and institutions in the socio-economic 
development wasn’t as good as desired,” the plan envisaged “radical 
changes in order to activate and enhance the capabilities of the civil 
society role in the coming stage.” The First Lady conceded in an 
international civil society conference in Damascus in January 2010: 
“The government alone cannot move this country forward.”38  
Despite all scepticism this represented an important step forward 
and a radical change compared to the decades of socialist etatism under 
Hafez al-Asad in which Syrians had nothing but the state as their 
reference point in life from charity to education or rural development. 
Nevertheless, NGO activists hoped for a more liberal NGO law. Since 
2005 a new NGO law had been “in planning” but it never materialized 
similar to the long-awaited law to liberalize the party system that was 
announced at the 10th Baath Congress.  
Observers expressed concern that while covering the conference in 
January 2010, the Ministry of Information and state press outlets 
continued to use the term ‘paternal society’ instead of ‘civil society’ in 
their Arabic-language coverage. This, they claimed, signalled that the 
will to loosen government control over the sector remained limited.39 
So far the government restricted NGOs mostly to their role in 
development, shying away from allowing interest groups to play a part 
in the system. Given that the economic opening is sandwiched between 
Baathist state control and neoliberal elements, the Baathist trade unions 
became frustrated with this development. Even in a market economy, 
trade unions would have the right to go on strike. Not in Syria.40 
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International Success and the Third Wave of Repression 
All in all, the hope that Syria would adopt domestic reforms if it did not 
continue to feel threatened from abroad did not materialize. In previous 
years, the thesis was plausible that with Syria’s isolation and existential 
threat against the regime, the political leadership was less ready for 
experiments and cracked down all the more on opposition movements.  
The reversal of this thesis has not come true. Despite a relaxation of 
international pressure and Syria’s re-emergence on the Arab and 
international stage, the suppression of political dissenters and human 
rights defenders has even increased since 2008. Correlations between 
domestic and foreign policies that were visible in the past were replaced 
by contradictions between both realms.  
Some three years before the wave of Arab protests reached Syria, 
the regime in Damascus had started to regain the initiative in foreign 
policy matters. European governments and even the US administration 
had come to the conclusion that Syria was at least a stable, politically 
approachable, and important geo-strategic player in the Middle East 
whose president was on the path of piecemeal reforms. US President 
Obama played soft on Syria in his effort to reverse the Syrian drift 
towards Iran and sent an ambassador to Damascus in January 2011 after 
nearly six years of diplomatic vacuum. This represented the last foreign 
policy success for Asad before the popular protests.  
It was hard work for the Syrian president to get to this point after 
years of isolation and stigmatization following the Iraq war and the 
Hariri disaster. Until 2011 it seemed that Asad had overcome his 
weakness as a political leader. In light of Iran’s post-election Green 
Revolution in summer 2009 Asad’s grip on power looked even stronger 
than that of his ally President Ahmedinejad. However, two years of 
successful diplomacy, constructive engagements such as the state 
recognition of Lebanon, rapprochement with Europe and even with the 
US, and a clever diversification of Syria’s foreign policy with Turkey as 
a close economic and political partner were destroyed by the failed 
approach of the Syrian regime towards popular demands. 
On the other hand, clinging to power by all means created common 
grounds with other autocratic Arab states and Asad was able to 
temporarily ease traditional tensions like those with Saudi Arabia or the 
Gulf States. It is worth remembering that Syria declared the Saudi 
military invasion to crush the protests in Bahrain as justified.41 
However, this overlap of authoritarian interests between Syria and Arab 
monarchies in the Gulf peninsula was fragile and short-lived. 
32    The Syrian Uprising 
In all three waves of domestic suppression, the secular Baathist 
regime silenced above all the moderate, secular voices calling for 
pluralism and piecemeal reform. In turn, Islamist currents had been 
gaining ground in Syria. To be sure, the Islamization of opposition 
politics is a general trend in the Arab Middle East and Syria is not 
immune. Yet there were other, more specific explanations. First, the 
regime, despite its secular orientation, and often more out of necessity 
than enthusiasm, is allied with Islamist partners like Iran, Hezbollah and 
Hamas in an “axis of resistance” to US and Israeli prerogatives. The 
regime certainly could not afford confrontation on two fronts, external 
and internal. A second explanation is that, not unlike other Arab 
regimes, Damascus adopted a conscious strategy of toleration for 
Islamism. Michel Kilo summarized the division of power between the 
regime and the Islamists with the pointed words: “Ours is the power, and 
you get the society.”42 This arrangement could be presented to the West 
as evidence that Syria would turn Islamist if the Baathists were to lose 
the state.  
In November 2010, when today’s events seemed still a remote 
possibility, Michel Kilo reflected upon the failures of the Civil Society 
Movement. He complained that the movement had been stopped in its 
tracks before it was able to broaden its circle of supporters, much less 
engineer the foundation of parties. But, in accordance with revolutionary 
patterns in Europe, he said, Syria’s educated middle class had been 
awakened. “Once the spark ignites the younger generation, we can 
withdraw,” Kilo concluded. “At least we have paved the way.”43  
In conclusion, the domestic secular opposition in Syria had not 
profited from the new dawn in Syria’s foreign policy nor had benevolent 
dissenters or cautioning voices. An experienced Syrian analyst, who 
worked within the government realm, conceded in an interview in 
October 2010: “I made the same mistake. I thought there was a 
correlation between foreign and domestic policy. […] With or without 
external pressure we have no political change in Syria. Domestic 
repression is a continuity not a contradiction.”44  
Analytical voices that had previously been approved by the 
government were silenced, too. The Orient Center for International 
Studies (OCIS), a think tank initiated by the foreign ministry and headed 
by Samir Altaqi, was closed in 2010. Apparently, their analysts became 
too frank about critical issues, such as economic development and 
foreign policy, and their contacts with foreigners could have been be 
misinterpreted as track two diplomacy. A disappointed member of the 
think tank said that the government was not interested in professional 
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analysis any longer but restricts itself to “intellectual masturbation” 
within a small circle of its own.45  
A well-known moderate sheikh, who has held political positions and 
was known to be pro-regime for years (but who also preferred to remain 
anonymous here), made a remarkable comment in visible frustration, 
equally at the end of 2010: “Unfortunately, under the pressure of the US 
the situation here was better. Now they [the regime] think they have a 
strong message.” He paused and added in a pensive tone: “We are going 
through a sensitive phase, through difficult times.”46 
These three quotes show that general frustration had been growing 
visibly within the wider sphere of regime supporters before the 
upheavals broke out. Barely five months later, the exuberant self-
confidence of the Asad regime, the arrogance of power, was seriously 
challenged. International recognition and importance was a valuable 
asset that had strengthened the regime’s domestic position vis-à-vis the 
opposition but also vis-à-vis former allies that had become too 
outspoken. Moreover, every criticism that was directed against Iran was 
interpreted as a pro-American stance and punished. The room for even 
cautious dissent had shrunk to dimensions of Hafez al-Asad’s times. 
The third wave of suppression – and the last one before the uprising 
in 2011 - started with the arrest of senior human rights advocate 
Haitham Maleh, head of the Human Rights Association of Syria 
(HRAS), in October 2009 and had been ongoing since then with various 
travel bans and the intimidation of intellectuals. The 80-year old Maleh 
was released only during the hectic weeks of late March 2011, after he 
had gone on hunger strike. Human rights lawyer Anwar al-Bounni was 
able to leave prison after ending his regular term in May 2011. Having 
spent five years in harsh conditions, Bounni stepped into freedom but 
also, amidst the revolt, into an unrecognizable Syria.  
Against this background, the military clampdown during the popular 
revolt in 2011 has been both a continuation and an escalation of the 
violation of human rights. Syria was by no means on the way toward 
serious reforms before the Arab Spring hit the Levant. This happened 
despite Asad’s soft-spoken appearance and Syria’s growing recognition 
on the international stage. 
Precisely at the moment when practically nobody in the 
international community, to some extent not even Israel, really had an 
interest in Asad’s ouster but tried to engage Syria as an important actor 
in a regional peace scenario, the president committed his most grievous 
mistakes and missed perhaps the last chances of his political career. 
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Asad’s Last Chances 
In its foreign policy, ideological makeup and social composition, Syria 
differs from Tunisia or Egypt. Yet the reasons and patterns of Syria’s 
crisis are similar to those in other Arab countries. The basic demands are 
about social justice, the end of arbitrariness and corruption, freedom of 
speech, perspectives of economic living-conditions, and democracy. 
Even in highly ideologized Syria the protesters did not go into the streets 
to blame powers outside their country. They were not linked to an anti-
imperialist discourse nor filled with hatred against foreign enemies, not 
even against Israel. In January one of the first reflexes of the regime in 
the light of the protests in North Africa was to increase salaries, 
subsidies and social benefits. The government knew exactly where its 
soft spot was and reacted quickly. But the measures turned out to be of 
little use, and were detrimental to the government’s long-term reform 
agenda. Political survival became the first priority.  
As in Tunisia, the main protests in Syria were sparked by a rather 
minor incident. After first peaceful gatherings in Damascus that went 
into oblivion later on, teens in Daraa sprayed buildings in town with 
graffiti in mid-March inspired by the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings. 
They wrote the famous slogan “The people want to overthrow the 
regime.” Instead of handling this incident with utmost care given the 
revolutionary environment in the region, the secret police forces arrested 
the children, put them into prison and tortured them. Family members 
protested. The police, being unused to civil unrest, used the logic of 
violence and shot several protesters dead. Anger rose countrywide and 
triggered more widespread demonstrations, which were met with more 
brutal force, in turn fueling more protest. 
The brutality of the security forces and the brazen arrogance of the 
governor of the Houran province were inherently typical of a 
suppressive regime and nothing really remarkable. But in the context of 
the Arab Spring even the people in Syria had lost their fear. The system 
failed to adjust its measures accordingly. Authorities lacked a tool set to 
cope with the situation. The political class was petrified when the 
protests spread to other towns and regions. It is no surprise that the Arab 
Spring hit precisely the most suppressive states in the Arab world. 
Ideologically and structurally, they do not have any room for absorbing 
societal and political shocks. The mindset as well as the training of 
authorities at all levels lacks deescalating strategies. In August Asad 
“acknowledged that some mistakes had been made by the security forces 
in the initial stages of the unrest and that efforts were under way to 
prevent their recurrence.”47 By then the damage had already been done.  
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But for several weeks into the protests it was not yet too late to 
preserve the famous red line in Syria: criticizing the president. Initially, 
the demonstrators’ wrath did not, by and large, target Asad himself. The 
fury was first directed toward Bashar’s brother Maher, who possesses a 
reputation for personal cruelty and, as head of the Fourth Division of the 
Republican Guard, is the backbone of the security solution. Other names 
increasingly heard in the protesters’ chants were Asef Shawkat, husband 
of Bashar’s sister Bushra, and deputy chief of staff of the army, and, 
above all, Rami Makhlouf, who owns Syria’s cell phone companies, 
duty-free shops and almost everything else that promises quick profits. 
Like his counterparts in Tunisia and Egypt, Makhlouf is a beneficiary of 
a classic predatory arrangement. The stories of Makhlouf’s corruption 
incense ordinary Syrians, from the working poor to the hard-pressed 
middle class. The first wave of protesters in Daraa did not topple statues 
of Asad but burned down the local outlet of Syriatel, Makhlouf’s cell 
phone company, as well as the court building and the Baath Party 
offices. 
After so many years of stalled reforms and broken promises the 
president missed this last minute opportunity to convince his population 
that he was different from the other Arab dictators and that he had the 
corrupt and violent authorities under control. As a result, he was to lose 
this crucial last asset, the strong red line that had become intrinsic to 
Syrian society since Hafez al-Asad. Several times Asad announced that 
the army would stop the killing of civilians and nothing changed. The 
positive attributes of his character that had circulated among Syrians 
throughout these years as well as his authority faded away quickly. 
Alawi paramilitary units, the so-called Shabiha, emerged at the hot spots 
and added to the indiscriminate slaughter. Either Asad played a double 
game or he was not in full control. The former confidence that had once 
been projected by the youngish leader will never be restored again. Asad 
lost the most important part of his political capital. 
In the first weeks of the protests the president mostly kept a low 
profile, feeding the gossip that he and his family were feuding over how 
to respond. Asad behaved like the leader of a “jumlukiyya,” as the 
Syrian opposition calls the country’s political system, melding the 
Arabic words for republic and monarchy. Rather than assuming 
responsibility for the crisis, the republico-monarch shunted blame 
downward, offering to reshuffle the cabinet and sack the lieutenants 
responsible for the hot spots around the country. In terms of public 
relations, the regime tried to make do with sending advisers, deputies or 
ministers before the cameras to explain its point of view, trotting out the 
president only in extremis. Much of the regime’s verbal response aimed 
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to criminalize the protests or portray them in sectarian terms; in tandem, 
the regime resorted to lethal force to suppress the agitation.  
By playing the sectarian card openly as never before during his rule, 
Asad destroyed the secular legacy that had been one of the Baathist 
trademarks. In addition, he tainted the Syrian spirit of tolerance that has 
century old roots in Syria’s social history. In better times the Syrian 
polity proved much more inclusive than that of other Arab states. The 
very same regime now chose sectarian strife as its emergency plan for 
survival. The targeted violence for sectarian purposes has become one of 
the greatest challenges of the Syrian people: resisting the temptation to 
fall into this trap.  
However, sectarianism can easily become a self-fulfilling prophecy 
amidst a tremendous propaganda war from all sides. Asad and his 
government started to criminalize and primordialize oppositional 
activities in their discourse, and some armed gangs did emerge to fulfill 
this prophecy, be it with sectarian slogans or with criminal energy. 
Mistrust between the religious groups has been rising, which has cost 
the protest movement momentum and followers. 
Secular Syrians, and especially Alawites, complain about the rising 
influence of radical Sunni groups, of Saudi influence, and of ever more 
daring preachers who use their exposure in the only legal civil public 
spaces – the mosques – to incite an open religious antagonism that had 
been absent from Syrian streets under the rule of the Asads. Witnesses 
report that Sunni groups entered Christian villages and intimidated them 
into joining the protests. In Homs and probably other places as well the 
takbir (the call “allahu akbar” - “God is Great”) called from balcony to 
balcony at nights has turned into a battle slogan for some protesters.  
All of this frightens religious minorities and secular Sunnis who fear 
religious radicalism more than a superficial secularist ideology and 
Baathist authoritarianism independent from the fact that they despise the 
regime’s violence, too. Many members of religious minorities, such as 
Christians and the Druze, not to mention Alawis, fear possible 
retribution from the Sunni majority. High-ranking Christian clerics in 
Damascus and Aleppo issued statements of support for Asad as late as 
2012 fearing an Iraqi scenario. 
But cleavages are not so clear cut. Much of the Sunni merchant 
class, as well, stuck to its alliance with the Asad regime. As minorities 
and middle-class Sunnis make up more than 50 percent of the 
population, they are not a negligible constituency. This is a highly 
significant political asset. If Asad loses the moderate Sunni merchant 
class, he is likely to lose it all.48 This might happen because of an 
economic downturn triggered by the protests or a sectarian escalation. 
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On the Christian side some of the community joined the protests in the 
street, especially at the beginning,49 and some key oppositional figures 
are in fact Christians, like Michel Kilo. Christians and secular people 
meet in mosques for the purpose of assembling after Friday prayers. 
Muslims in Hama invited Christians to join their demonstrations at an 
early stage, and Muslims and Christians went out to demonstrate 
harmony as was reported from Damascus to mention a few examples 
only. 
A similar official propaganda that incited sectarian mistrust could be 
witnessed in Tunisia and especially Egypt, too. However, the peaceful 
character of the demonstrators and their cross sectarian solidarity 
prevailed in the minds of the revolutionaries and in the international 
media (despite some setbacks in the post-revolutionary period). This 
may be harder to recognize in Syria where for a long time cross-
sectarian appeals have had little central direction and few political 
slogans.  
In conclusion, one of Asad’s strategies was to keep up the fragile 
alliance between religious minorities and the moderate Sunni merchant 
class. This worked as long as the state propaganda managed to uphold a 
different narrative of the crisis as led by criminals and terrorists directed 
from abroad. It also worked as long as the clampdown did not pass a 
certain limit of atrocities and bloodshed. Later it became more and more 
difficult for clerics, who represent the religious communities, to find 
supportive words in favour of the regime. The fear of post-revolutionary 
chaos and possible persecution of Christians or other minorities by 
radical Islamists as in neighbouring Iraq floated in a delicate balance 
with disgust about the regime’s methods. It was up to Asad and his clan 
to define the tipping point. 
Attempts at Political Appeasement 
As the protests escalated further, the regime turned to attempts at 
political accommodation and, eventually, measures of appeasement. In 
Tunisia and Egypt, such concessions had no conciliatory effect upon the 
crowds because the announcements always came a few days or weeks 
too late. Also in Syria the concessions appeared poorly chosen for the 
circumstances. On April 7 2011, Asad granted citizenship to 150,000 
Kurds in Syria who had been stateless, answering the long-time demand 
of Kurdish activists. The measure was so overdue that Asad got little 
credit for it. “Our cause is democracy for the whole of Syria. Citizenship 
is the right of every Syrian. It is not a favour. It is not the right of anyone 
to grant,” retorted Habib Ibrahim, leader of a major Kurdish party.50 
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Nevertheless, the Kurds did not join the protest movement as 
vehemently as their deprived status would have suggested. Other reflex-
like concessions, like permitting schoolteachers to wear the niqab (full 
face veil) again after abolishing it the year before, closing a casino, and 
launching a new religious state TV programme were made to placate 
Islamists, but meant little to the wider base of opposition demonstrators 
who called for real political reform.  
The regime hastily announced political pluralism (or a semblance 
thereof) under the pressure of the street. Suddenly, long-standing 
demands of the opposition were readily picked up. Among them was in 
particular the new party law which was meant to break the monopoly of 
the Baath Party. The draft had been gathering dust in a presidential desk 
drawer for years. By Syrian standards, the political concessions were 
very far-reaching; long years of civil society activism had been unable to 
achieve them. By the yardstick of the times, however, the moves turned 
out to be inadequate. The same dynamic holds for the regime’s various 
other promises, like erecting a legal framework for the activities of 
NGOs or promulgating a new media law. It even holds for declaring an 
end to martial law, a step that, rhetorically, has always been tied to 
liberation of the Golan Heights from Israeli occupation and the end to 
hostilities with Israel. Now it was purely domestic stresses that brought 
such measures to the forefront of regime calculations. The government 
was about to lose one trump card after another. 
Asad missed the chance to save his legacy by making a last-minute 
U-turn against internal resistance. After years of waiting he could have 
promoted himself as part of the solution instead of persisting as part of a 
growing problem. Many Syrians would have preferred to embark on a 
transition in stability. For this purpose Asad would have had to 
overcome his personality and to counter family resistance. Asad does 
not have the audacity and vision of his personal friend King Juan Carlos 
of Spain; he is no political hero who would become a champion of 
reform, instead resisting it within an obsolete and ideologically eroded 
system. For example, if Riad Seif had been included in Asad’s reform 
government at an early stage in 2011, this would have silenced half of 
the opposition, opined Sadiq al-Azm.51 But Asad missed it once again. 
Bridges in a Country on Fire  
Few leaders who apply a similar cruelty with the aim of suppressing 
popular demands are as fortunate as Asad with regard to enjoying the 
last remnants of a moderate opposition. Once again the quote of former 
head of Syrian intelligence Suleiman from the year 2003 comes to mind: 
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The Syrian regime can be considered lucky that it had opponents but no 
enemies. This even held true when the country was on fire. 
The willingness to build bridges despite all reservations was 
supported, most prominently, from an unexpected protagonist – Michel 
Kilo – who has been in conflict with the regime and Asad personally all 
his life, who was imprisoned twice, and who played a leading role in 
Syria’s Civil Society Movement and the Damascus Spring. In articles in 
the Lebanese press, Kilo called for a national dialogue with Asad on 
board. Kilo feared the collapse of Syria’s societal fabric and civil war. 
“This civil/consensual Syrian possibility implies two things”, Kilo 
reflected in the leftist independent newspaper, as-Safir, in April 2011,  
[t]he regime’s abstinence from relying on the security related solution 
in confronting the current situation; and the abstinence of the current 
movement from calling for ousting the regime. There must be a 
solution entirely based on a global national dialogue that would push 
away these two situations in order to prevent the country from turning 
into a fighting arena […]. No matter who will be the victorious side, 
the cost of the confrontation will be deadly for the regime […]. In 
addition, [there will also be a hefty price to pay] for the other side, 
which must realize that erroneous calculations will not lead to the 
desired freedom but rather to the collapse of the Syrian society’s unity 
in addition to the destruction and dismantlement of the state. The only 
side that could benefit from a security solution […] will be Israel.52 
This discourse once again displays the embeddedness of important parts 
of the traditional Syrian opposition in the Pan-Arab nationalist 
discourse. 
His stance against the polarizing currents in Syria brought Kilo 
considerable criticism from oppositional figures who were being hunted 
down, who had to fear for their lives, who changed their beds every 
night or who saw their friends being tortured. Others applauded Kilo’s 
far-sightedness in such a crucial moment of Syria’s history. Kilo was 
invited for talks with Asad’s adviser Buthaina Sha’ban and Vice 
President Farouq al-Shara, something that had been unthinkable in the 
past. Kilo’s travel ban was lifted and he went to Europe and Cairo to 
defend his mission. The German-speaking opposition activist possesses 
a wide intellectual horizon and knew that he was walking on a 
dangerous tightrope especially in a situation in which it was not clear 
where the regime defined its limits of violence. While his method may 
have been controversial, there is no doubt that Kilo’s fundamental goals 
remained clear. He intended to work toward change “from the status quo 
to the revolution; from tyranny to freedom; from change driven by the 
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authorities to societal change; and from the familial society to the civil 
society.”53  
People like Kilo in tandem with the secular editor Louay Hussein 
and a few others provided another window of opportunity for Asad. 
Hussein was the main organizer of the famous conference at the 
Semiramis Hotel in downtown Damascus on 27 June 2011. In the first 
open gathering of its kind in Syria the domestic opposition tried to 
redefine itself in heated debates, while an escalation of the conflict was 
looming on the horizon. Critics said that the regime allowed the meeting 
with the intention of driving a wedge between the opposition groups 
inside and outside Syria.54 The opposition in exile has always rejected 
anything less than regime change. The declaration of the Semiramis 
Conference called for a peaceful transition to democracy and an end to 
the Asad family’s 40-year-old monopoly on power. Thus the final goals 
have become almost identical. What divided the groups were the means 
on how to get there (apart from personal jealousies and the question of 
foreign support or even foreign intervention). The Semiramis 
Conference also called for an immediate end to the security crackdown 
and the army’s withdrawal from towns and villages. This demand has 
been pending since then without having been fulfilled. 
A tweet that was sent out from the hotel gathering attributed the 
following quote to Michel Kilo: “80 percent of the Syrian population are 
under 35. Where are they in this conference?” The young people were 
not interested anymore in declarations and debates. Most of them had 
never been involved in the discourse of the traditional Civil Society 
Movement. These young people were now in the streets. 
The Semiramis Conference can be considered as yet another last-
minute opportunity to engage with the opposition before Syria headed 
one step further towards the edge of civil war. The minimum condition 
to continue a dialogue was not met, since the violence continued 
unabated. Instead, the regime tried to launch a national dialogue on its 
own. But it failed to convince most oppositional figures inside and 
outside Syria. A Syrian researcher based in France and linked to the 
opposition recalled that he received a phone call from Syria’s Vice 
President Farouq al-Shara, who asked him if he would participate in the 
national dialogue. The researcher wanted to know who the protagonists 
on the government’s side were. Al-Shara responded that it was himself 
and the President’s adviser Bouthaina Sha’ban. The researcher replied 
that it would not make any sense because even these political veterans 
did not exert any influence any longer on the Asad clan’s decisions. 
According to the researcher, al-Shara did not even contradict him.55 
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In the standoff between the regime and the opposition Kilo refused 
to become a member of the Syrian National Council (SNC) that was 
founded in September/October 2011 and comprises various new 
opposition groups like the Local Coordination Committees in Syria, 
long-known protagonists like the exiled Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, 
other oppositional figures in exile but also members of the domestic 
opposition like Riad Seif. All of a sudden, Kilo, who had only left prison 
in summer 2009, found himself on the regime’s list as being part of the 
“good” or the “nationalist opposition” (mu’arada al-wataniye) in 
contrast to the foreign elements of conspiracy against Syria in exile 
(mu’arada al-charijiye) in the regime’s terminology.  
Whether it is actively promoted by the government or not, the 
opposition is far from united. Kilo and others formed the Coordination 
Committee for Democratic Change (CCDC) that stands against the 
mostly exile dominated SNC. In November several members of the 
CCDC left the organization because they suspected cooperation between 
the regime’s secret services and the Committee. Syria is polarized not 
only between pro and anti-Asad camps. The deep rift between the main 
oppositional streams of thought became tangible when on 10 November 
2011 representatives of this Committee, Hassan Abdul-Azim, Michel 
Kilo, Louay Hussein and Monzer Haloum, were attacked on their way to 
a meeting with the Arab League on Cairo’s Tahrir Square. The Syrian 
assaulters blamed them for cooperating with the regime in Damascus 
and called for international protection of civilians in Syria.56  
The regime’s continued and uncompromising “security solution” 
undermined all persisting efforts to search for a middle way. Moderate 
oppositional figures who had stood up for a “soft transition” to 
democracy for a decade were now losing their authority in this polarized 
environment.  
Foreign Initiatives Rebuked and Friends Lost 
While the UN Security Council was at loggerheads with Russia and 
China protecting Syria, the regime did not have to fear any foreign 
intervention similar to the Libyan case. Nevertheless, several external 
initiatives have tried to build bridges for Asad to end the crisis. All of 
them have been rejected. 
The first important opportunity offered itself with the Turkish 
initiative. In the years after 2004 relations between Syria and Turkey 
radically improved. Both governments held common cabinet meetings 
and talked of “family bonds” when they referred to bilateral relations. 
Not long before the crisis Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
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Erdogan spent a few days on holiday with the Asad family. The 
countries abolished visas requirements between the two states and 
established free trade across their borders. The good relations with 
Turkey certainly represented the greatest success for Syria in the past 
few years. Thus Damascus aptly managed to diversify its foreign policy.  
However, the uprising in Syria put Turkey’s pro-democracy stance 
to a serious test. After a phase of deliberation, similarly as in the Libyan 
case, the Turkish government finally opted to support the side of human 
rights and democracy. Criticism from Ankara rose with the escalation of 
violence in Syria. Erdogan followed through his role as an advocate of 
change in the Arab world after harsh criticism against autocrats in 
Tunisia and Egypt. 
Given the former harmony of “family bonds” on the emotional level 
and the practical improvements between both countries, the visit of 
Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ahmed Davutoglu on 9 August 2011 to 
Damascus represented a shocking change of paradigm. Davutoglu came 
to Damascus to deliver an “earnest” message from Erdogan that called 
for an end to the violence and for all sides to embark on a Turkish 
sponsored peace plan. Asad reacted indignantly and said: “If you came 
for a compromise, then we reject it. If you want to have war, then you 
can have it – in the entire region.”57 This was an affront to Erdogan, not 
only personally, but also vis-à-vis Erdogan’s envisaged role of Turkey 
as a regional player and mediator. 
The willingness to relinquish friends and political trump cards in 
rage or short-sightedness has deprived the Syrian regime of possible 
future options within the framework of steering out of the crisis. As 
mentioned above, the protests hit Syria at a time when Western 
governments had more or less accommodated themselves with the 
Syrian regime or at least with its strategic importance in the region 
despite Syria’s tainted human rights record. European and US diplomats, 
high-ranking politicians, and academics went back and forth to 
Damascus until the time when the revolt broke out. 
Still in late March US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pointed 
out: “There’s a different leader in Syria now. Many of the members of 
Congress from both parties who have gone to Syria in recent months 
have said they believe he’s a reformer.”58 This tone was dramatically 
different not only from the condemnations of the Libyan regime, but 
also from rhetoric once employed by President George W. Bush. This 
change of attitude in Washington had been the Syrian political aim for 
many years. And it was destroyed so quickly. 
In July Clinton made clear that the US had definitely changed sides 
when she claimed that Asad had lost his credibility to rule. “President 
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Assad is not indispensable, and we have absolutely nothing invested in 
him remaining in power”, Clinton said.59 In only three months Asad lost 
yet another important chance to become part of the solution instead 
remaining part of the problem.  
Asad’s tone vis-à-vis former friends and the international 
community became harsher the longer the conflict simmered. He burnt 
important bridges and lost his soft-spoken and educated image that he 
had gained in various conversations with foreign heads of state and other 
politicians. In bilateral conversations as well as in interviews Asad used 
to impress his conversational partners with his reflective style.  
Despite the rebuke of Turkey’s peace offer, Erdogan’s hefty 
criticism against Asad’s policies, and the hosting of Syrian opposition 
groups in Turkey, links between Ankara and Damascus were not cut. 
Economic cooperation continued unrestrictedly. Even Davutoglu did not 
refrain from visting Damascus again in October. But this meeting did 
not contribute to a settlement either. More menaces emerged from 
Damascus. According to Arab sources, President Asad said: “If a crazy 
measure is taken against Damascus, I will need not more than six hours 
to transfer hundreds of rockets and missiles to the Golan Heights to fire 
them at Tel Aviv.” The Arab source said that the Syrian president told 
the Turkish Foreign Minister that he would also call on Hezbollah to 
launch a rocket attack on the Jewish state.60 Asad’s warning came after 
Davutoglu informed him that he would face a war similar to the NATO 
aggression on the Libyan regime if he continued to crack down on his 
people. 
After the alienation of Turkey it was up to the Arabs to offer Asad a 
way out. The Arab League headed by the former transitional foreign 
minister of Egypt, Nabil al-Arabi, presented two peace initiatives in 
September and November 2011. Reportedly, Arab states offered asylum 
to Asad to defuse the situation, too. The mediation attempts included a 
call to halt all violence against civilians and to withdraw Syrian troops 
from the cities. The League urged Asad to avoid sectarianism and – 
entirely in line with the Syrian government – strongly recommended not 
to create a pretext for any kind of foreign intervention. It further called 
for compensation for the families of the victims and for a release of all 
political prisoners. The initiative moreover called on Asad to commit to 
the political reforms he had announced, including a multi-party system.  
Asad chose not to benefit from either of the initiatives, although he 
formally accepted the second one. But nothing happened, similar to the 
moment in which he had declared reforms and an end of the shooting in 
April. Instead, the killing went on also in November and escalated in the 
cities of Homs and Hama in particular. A refreshed Arab League – 
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composed of autocracies but also of post-revolutionary states in 
democratic transition – condemned the killing of civilians in unusually 
harsh terms. Anti-Syrian Qatar held the presidency of the League, and 
Syria’s adversary Saudi Arabia grew increasingly impatient, too. 
Even observers who have often echoed parts of the regime’s 
ideology grew increasingly frustrated by the gambling away of political 
options. The young historian Sami Moubayed, professor at Syria’s 
prestigious private University of Kalamoon and editor-in-chief of 
Forward Magazine, reasoned after the failure of the first Arab League 
initiative: “It could have been a lifejacket for the nation that would end 
the deadlock between the government and demonstrations which have 
continued non-stop, despite violence and the rising death toll, since mid-
March. By snubbing it, the Syrians probably have lost a golden 
opportunity.” Moubayed recommended: “What they should have done is 
take it as it stands, then rebrand it as a Syrian initiative - regardless of 
the Arab League and Qatar - because it is a win-win formula both for the 
Syrian government and the Syrian street. To quote the Godfather, it was 
an offer they shouldn't have, rather than “couldn't have refused.”61 
In the preceding years Asad had managed to accommodate some of 
Syria’s enemies, including Saudi Arabia, and he had made new friends 
in the region and on the international stage. Every month that went by in 
the year 2011 Asad gambled away remnant pieces of his credibility and 
political leeway. His accumulated foreign policy successes now lie in 
shatters. He manoeuvred himself into a far worse position than he had 
been under international isolation following the Iraq war and the Hariri 
assassination. In case Asad survives the protests, it is improbable that he 
will ever recover politically and be able to rebuild the foreign policy 
environment that he had so arduously worked to achieve. He will have 
to rely ever more on his staunchest ally Iran and on Hezbollah, whereas 
under his father Hafez al-Asad it was rather Hezbollah that relied on 
Damascus. If at all, Asad will rule a crippled Syria, domestically and 
internationally. This is dangerous since the tectonic plates of Iranian and 
Saudi Arabian interests pass through the Levant. Frictions will increase. 
Syria, once the self-confident, pragmatic middle power under Hafez 
al-Asad and the incarnation of authoritarian stability in the region, could 
turn into the chessboard of conflicting interests, a hub for arms trade and 
instability. No matter how events in Syria unfold, it has been shaken 
beyond return, domestic power structures are shifting, and the regime 
has destroyed its legacy. Only a peaceful transition could avoid a 
decomposition of Syria’s rich religious and ethnic mosaic and a decline 
of Syria’s weight in the region. After a decade of missed chances and 
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numerous sacrifices Syrians long for the fruits of the Arab Spring: good 
governance and the end to fear.
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The Syrian Uprising and the 
Transnational Public Sphere: 
Transforming the Conflict in Syria1 
Adam Almqvist 
Introduction 
“We’re in the process of writing our own version of the Syrian 
revolution” – Rami Nakhle, Syrian Cyberactivist, Beirut.2 
“I am sure you all know that Syria is facing a great conspiracy whose 
tentacles extend to some nearby countries and far-away countries, with 
some inside the country” – Syrian President Bashar al-Asad, Speech at 
the People’s Assembly.3 
“One man's imagined community is another man's political prison.” – 
Arjun Appadurai, “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural 
Economy”.4 
This paper examines the ways in which processes of 
transnationalism have transformed the nature of the conflict in 
Syria. Specifically, the analysis surveys the actors (diasporic groups, 
transnational cyberactivists, cosmopolitan human rights activists), sites 
(embassies, internet chat-rooms, satellite television newsrooms, 
Facebook community pages) and strategies (dissemination of narratives, 
cyberwarfare, symbolic productions) which define, frame, contextualise 
and mediate the conflict. The analysis is centered on the network of 
Syrian transnational cyberactivists that emerged amidst the Arab 
revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia, and their position within the wider 
oppositional transnational public.  
The Syrian uprising is not only situated within the transnational 
public sphere; it is partly constituted by a struggle over the 
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transnationalization of the public sphere itself. It will be argued that this 
transnationalization constitutes a central strategy of the global complex 
of anti-regime actors, referred to here as the oppositional transnational 
public. Both inside and outside Syria, oppositional political strategies, in 
addition to efforts to dismantle the material structures of the Baathist 
state, are geared towards breaking the imaginative hold that the state 
exercises over people and towards fragmenting its monopoly over 
representation of reality. This is achieved through the process of 
transnationalising the domestic public sphere through the configuration 
of oppositional publics transgressing the national territory, inclusion of 
diasporas in such publics and the dissemination of revolutionary 
narratives through transnational media. One of the regime’s main tactics, 
therefore, has been to counteract the transnationalization of the domestic 
public sphere by reinforcing a strict symbolic dichotomy between 
“inside” and “outside” in order to re-nationalise and maintain control 
over the fields of symbolic and discursive production. In addition, it has 
had to “deterritorialize” its own response by utilizing strategies like 
cyberwarfare and cracking down on transnational cyberactivists. There 
is a tendency among scholars and commentators to explore the ways in 
which transnational processes lead to consolidation of networks, 
configuration of unified discourses, and popular mobilisation. However, 
this is often bound up with the Habermasian vision of the public sphere 
as a monolithic institution which curtails the power of the state. The 
transnational public sphere, however, is far from monolithic. The 
consolidation of one transnational public is accompanied by the creation 
of other publics. When analysing the sites, actors, and strategies that 
constitute the oppositional transnational public it becomes apparent that 
this story of consolidation and effective mobilisation runs parallel to 
processes of fragmentation and polarisation among various transnational 
publics. This analysis will examine both parallel processes – those of 
consolidation and fragmentation – and the configurations of power 
through processes of exclusion and inclusion which underpin such 
formations.  
The paper will demonstrate how the process of the 
transnationalization /deterritorialization of the public sphere transforms 
the very nature of the conflict in Syria. The purpose of this investigation 
is not to explore the dynamics and power struggles between the inside 
and outside elements of the opposition. Neither does it concern itself 
with who "owns" the revolution, and whose legitimate and ethical right 
it is to represent it. Rather it seeks to problematize the distinction 
between inside and outside and map the contours of various struggles 
and contestations in the very cleavages between the inside and outside. 
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Furthermore, it seeks to demonstrate how the practices and strategies of 
all actors – cyberactivists, local coordination committees, exiled 
political activists, ordinary protesters inside Syria, the state and regime – 
are affected by these transnational processes. The research, conducted 
between May and September 2011, draws on interviews with Syrian 
cyberactivists, human rights activists and opposition leaders in the US, 
Canada, UK, Sweden and Qatar, as well as analyses of the online 
practises of these actors, and covers events during the first six months of 
the uprising.  
New Media and the Transnationalization of the Public Sphere 
With the rise of new media in recent decades, scholars from a variety of 
disciplines have identified a transnationalization of public spheres, and a 
growing body of literature has mapped the contours of such domains.5 
Transnationalism, here, refers to a process, in the words of Ahiwa Ong, 
“of disembedding from a set of localized relations in the homeland 
nation and re-embedding in new overlapping networks that cut across 
borders”.6 Such networks, while partly embedded in local relations, 
increasingly migrate to new media. And as Manuel Castells argues, “our 
society, the network society, organizes its public sphere, more than any 
other historical form of organization, on the basis of media 
communication networks.”7  
The increasing transnationalization of the public sphere prompts 
analyses of political processes disassociated from citizenship and the 
politics of fixed locations. This de-nationalisation of communicative 
infrastructures poses challenges to Habermas’s initial Westphalian-
national model, whereby the correlations between national public 
spheres and sovereign powers are eroded.8 Within these social fields, or 
transnational public spheres, new forms of political mobilisation, 
engagement in homeland politics by diasporas, and cyberprotests have 
emerged.9 Scholars have also noted how states must transform their 
power technologies to adapt to this environment, which Basch et al. 
identify as the “de-territorialized nation states”.10 Diasporas are both 
products and agents of transnationalization , what	   Kachig	   Tölölyan	  
describes	   as	   “the exemplary communities of the transnational 
moment.”11 The transnationalization of the public sphere and new media 
opens up new channels for diaspora populations to engage with 
homeland politics.  
In Middle Eastern Studies, processes of transnationalism have been 
studied from a variety of angles: how Arab diasporas use technologies in 
structuring their relation to the homeland;12 the formations of new 
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subjectivities online among diasporas;13 the use of new media in Arab 
transnational NGOs;14 the effects of new media on Islam and the 
consequent fragmentation of religious authority and establishments of 
alternative sources of religious interpretation.15 More attention has also 
been directed in recent years towards public sphere theory in relation to 
the Middle East, both through new media and more traditional sites.16 
The Arab uprisings present scholars of Middle Eastern Studies and 
transnationalism with new challenges of how to account both for the 
way in which transnationalism has eroded regimes’ abilities to govern in 
the first place, and the way in which transnational processes have 
enabled, not only aided, the revolutionary movements.17  
Firstly, the paper will historicise the transnationalization of the 
public sphere in the Syrian uprising by looking at the relationship 
between the domestic and transnational public spheres prior to the start 
of the uprising. Secondly, the formation of the oppositional transnational 
public will be traced by illustrating, through the example of the network 
of Syrian diaspora cyberactivists, how transnational actors, sites and 
strategies came to organise into a public. Thirdly, this transnational 
public will be contextualised within the wider transnational public 
sphere by looking at the deterritorialization of the state and the processes 
of inclusion and exclusion which govern the boundaries of the 
oppositional public.  
Origins of the Present Transnationalization of the Public Sphere: 
Simultaneous Suppression of the Domestic and Opening up of the 
Transnational Public Spheres in Syria during the 1990s and 2000s  
The transnational character of the Syrian uprising can be traced to the 
parallel incongruous processes of repression of the domestic public 
sphere and the opening up of the transnational public sphere underway 
during the last two decades. In the context of Bashar al-Asad’s accession 
to power in 2000, a movement of intense civil society and oppositional 
activities was set in motion. In his inaugural speech, al-Asad spoke of 
the need for “constructive thinking”, reform and modernisation,18 and 
subsequently released 600 political prisoners.19 Over 1000 civil society 
activists signed the Statement of 1000, demanding thoroughgoing 
political reform, and meetings were held among activists and dissidents 
in private salons. Something approaching a public sphere was shaped as 
“dissidents at least became aware of each other’s existence, and the 
language of reform was injected into political discourses.”20 This 
movement, the Damascus Spring, was succeeded by a harsh repression 
of civil society activism, the Damascus Winter, which exhausted much 
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of the political energy released by the window opened up amidst Bashar 
al-Asad’s succession.  
In addition to such political mobilisation, the introduction of the 
internet provided an instrument for civil society activists to counter the 
atomisation of society which characterised the regime’s power strategies 
by establishing horizontal relations between new media users and 
transforming “subjects into citizens”.21 Yet, the regime largely managed 
to contain this emerging domestic online public sphere. Rather than 
simply repressing these side-effects across the board, the regime opted 
for the familiar strategy of what Miriam Cook calls “commissioned 
criticism”, whereby the regime tolerated (occasionally even encouraged) 
limited dissidence within a set of “red lines” coupled with a capricious 
policy of repression of those who crossed them.22 Thus, there was a 
limited public sphere, configured partly online, yet contained within the 
regime’s orbit of influence through the structures of “red lines”. During 
the Damascus Spring, the Muslim Brotherhood and various secular 
elements managed to reach some common ground, although they 
remained fragmented by regional interests, sectarian allegiances, and 
personal animosity.23 By 2010, the domestic opposition movement was 
largely exhausted. Najib Ghadbian, a prominent dissident in exile, 
described the situation for political dissidence as “desolate.”24  
Parallel to these cycles of mobilisation and repression of a nascent 
domestic public sphere was an increasing deterritorialization of the 
wider Arab transnational public sphere. In contrast to the impression 
given by many accounts of new media and the Arab uprisings, the 
transnationalization /deterritorialization of the public sphere did not 
begin with the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, but can be traced 
back at least to the 1990s.25 In the period from the 1960s to the 1980s, 
television was largely appropriated as a mobilizational tool by Arab 
states to facilitate state-building and the consolidation of post-colonial 
nationhood.26 As the strategies of economic opening and state-
domination of informational flows continued in the 1990s, a market was 
created for satellite channels, such as Al-Jazeera, thus displacing 
political argument into the transnational public sphere.27 In response to 
this development, structural reform of Syria’s media landscape was 
initiated. In 2005, Information Minister Mehdi Dakhlallah declared 
Syrian newspapers “unreadable” and talked about ushering in a 
transition from “dirigiste media” to “media with a purpose”.28 The 
regime decided to allow private print media. Several magazines have 
since emerged, as well as Syria’s first private radio channel, Al-Madina 
FM. Ali Farzat, a cartoonist and prominent figure during the uprising, 
ran a private newspaper in the early 2000s that was closed down after it 
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provoked the censors.29 While the opening up of the media landscape 
can partly be read as the regime succumbing to pressures from crony 
capitalists to open up new markets for private investment,30 the strategy 
was a necessary evil for the regime who now competed in an 
international market for audiences’ attention. This process amounted to 
a loosening of the state’s monopoly on dissemination of information, 
symbols, and over shaping the national imaginary. The relationship 
between the internet and the regime in Syria prior to the uprising, 
moreover, must be understood in the context of the contradictions 
inherent in the regime’s modernisation project. Upon his accession to 
power, Bashar al-Asad, who had been president of the Syrian Computer 
Society during the 1990s, introduced computer lessons in schools, 
reduced costs of internet usage and paved the way for the opening of 
internet cafes.31 The internet provided an instrument for some people to 
look beyond Syria and access the increasingly transnationalized Arab 
public spheres characterised by privatisation of religion, inclusion of 
diasporas and ideational contestation. In the southern city of Daraa in 
early March 2011, when 15 school children was arrested and tortured 
for spraying graffiti on the walls of their schools, the event that sparked 
mass-demonstrations in Daraa and triggered the nationwide uprising, 
they did so demanding the "downfall of the regime", a slogan they had 
picked up via satellite television from the revolutions in Egypt and 
Tunisia.  
These parallel processes described above, of increased ideational 
contestation in transnational arenas, the suppression of such contestation 
domestically and the absence of institutions able to incorporate such 
contestation, was instrumental in precipitating a frontal assault on the 
hegemony of the state in Syria, This was an assault partly launched from 
multiple transnational sites by multiple transnational actors utilising 
transnationalised strategies. This sudden social movement that sprung up 
in February-March 2011, therefore, cannot simply be understood as a 
remobilisation of the internal Damascus Declaration opposition, nor an 
explosive realignment of Syria’s nascent public sphere, reinvigorated by 
revolutionary discourses from Egypt and Tunisia. In addition, it is 
crucial to take into account Syria’s embeddedness within the 
transnational public sphere in order to understand this sudden 
mobilisation as well as the way in which transnational processes are 
transforming the nature of the conflict. The Arab uprisings of 2011 in 
general, and the Syrian uprising in particular, represents a new face in 
the transnationalization /deterritorialization of the public sphere, a 
product of the repression of domestic public spheres. Within this 
transnational public sphere, a dominant oppositional public has emerged 
The Syrian Uprising and the Transnational Public Sphere   55 
in which new actors, sites and strategies have arisen, all of which 
transcend the physical territory of Syria itself.  
Actors: The Anatomy of an Oppositional Transnational Public  
Whereas the analysis will primarily focus on the transnational 
cyberactivists, the wider oppositional transnational public will be 
sketched out here in order to account for the process whereby the 
transnationalization of the public sphere becomes bound up with 
political strategies by various actors in the Syrian uprising and itself 
becomes a locus of contestation. The Syrian uprising has seen the re-
mobilisation of large groups of Syrians based outside Syria. The external 
oppositional transnational public is a heterogeneous public that is bound 
together by genealogies of adversity towards the Baathist regime, often 
tied to their circumstances of migration. Roughly, three networks can be 
identified which constitute the external segments of the inchoate 
oppositional transnational public.  
 One network is comprised by various exiled well-educated 
cosmopolitan intellectuals and human rights activists that have fled 
Syria over the last 20 years, usually in relation to civil society activism 
in Syria, the most prominent of whom are figures such as Radwan 
Ziadeh, Ammar Abdulhammid and Ausama Monajed. The Damascus 
winter – the violent crackdown on opposition and civil society 
movements that had proliferated in the brief period of liberalisation 
following Bashar al-Asad’s accession to power – forced several activists 
and dissidents into exile, thus inadvertently consolidating such 
transnational networks.32 A variety of NGOs,33 email lists and other 
communication platforms have linked these actors over the years.34 At 
present this group is connected to activists inside Syria and acts as 
reluctant spokespersons on their behalf.  
Another network is made up of the transnational cyberactivists. Due 
to their opaque methods they have largely been ignored in favour of the 
traditional opposition’s many overt political spectacles. Constituted 
primarily by younger first-generation immigrants of Syrian descent, this 
network partly comprises of children of political exiles who fled the 
country during the turbulent 1980s or later.35 Also included in this 
network, which primarily operates online, is a large number of Syrian 
political refugees who has fled the country during the uprising.36 The 
cyberactivists are part of a diasporic elite, often educated in engineering 
or IT.37 They are drawn from the loose set of actors who were pioneers 
in establishing various political, religious and cultural networks among 
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Arab diapsoras. As Jon Anderson notes in his research on Arab 
diasporas and new media during the 1990s, 
what sets them apart from other transnational populations is their self-
confidence, often manifest as self-righteousness, that is enabled not 
just by mechanical and electrical technology, but also by the 
intellectual authority of their professions, and the confidence those 
inspire, which they apply to -- intrude upon -- other domains, notably 
of politics, religion and culture.38  
It is difficult to estimate the number of cyberactivists operating from 
abroad. According to activists themselves there are hundreds, probably 
thousands. A minority work openly while others operate under 
pseudonyms in order to avoid the risk of intimidation by Syrian 
embassies in host-countries, and to protect their relatives in Syria from 
retribution. 39  
The third network is the traditional opposition in exile which is 
comprised of the Muslim Brotherhood, Kurdish Nationalists, tribal 
leaders and various leftist parties. In the early stages of the uprising, this 
group of actors saw themselves somewhat marginalised from the wider 
transnational public. Even though they were formally represented in the 
Syrian National Council, they lacked influence both on protestors inside 
Syria and on the wider oppositional transnational public. There is a 
generational divide in the oppositional transnational public which has 
proved hard for the traditional opposition to overcome.40 It is clear, as 
Joe Pace has noted, that the ideology of the old-guard opposition did not 
resonate among young people and there have been complaints that they 
“were stuck in the 1960s, bogged down in the mire of petty ideological 
debates over the fine points of Leninism, socialism, or Nasserism”.41 
Another factor is the sites at which the oppositional transnational public 
operates. Osama Kadi, a Canada based intellectual and dissident says 
that “traditional political parties have not adjusted themselves to the new 
era of technology. This has created a gap between themselves and the 
street”.42  
Thus, whereas there has been significant disparity between the 
external traditional opposition, such as the SNC, and the protest 
movement inside Syria, other external oppositional networks, such as 
the cyberactivists, have been embedded in networks consisting of inside 
and outside actors which transgress the national territory of Syria. 
However, even if the liberal, inclusivist discourses of the cyberactivists 
and diaspora intellectuals dominated the oppositional transnational 
public in the early stages, underpinning this partial ostracization of the 
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traditional opposition, there were ample indications that the ethnic 
(Kurdish nationalists), sectarian (Muslim Brotherhood), tribal (various 
tribal leaders) and ideological (various leftists parties) ideational 
affiliations were gaining more influence as the uprising expanded and 
incorporated new sets of internal and external actors, and as the regime 
violence led to a radicalization of the conflict.  
With the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia as a backdrop, these three 
amorphous networks started to mould into a transnational public, by 
shaping networks among themselves and with protestors and activists 
inside Syria, as well as parts of the diaspora which has more or less 
enthusiastically participated in online discussions on the platforms 
established by these core activist networks  
In the early stages of the uprising, the cyberactivists were 
particularly instrumental, especially in their efforts to bridge the wider 
Arab uprisings and Syrian politics. Inspired by the Tunisian and 
Egyptian revolutions, groups of young, computer-savvy, people from the 
Syrian diaspora – scattered all around the globe, from Beirut and Paris to 
Los Angeles and Stockholm – began to assemble online with the aim of 
instigating a similar trajectory for Syria. A Facebook page labelled 
Syrian Revolution 2011 was set up to provide a virtual platform for 
oppositional activism. By early February it amassed around 17,000 
followers, the overwhelming majority of whom were from the diaspora. 
They called for an Egyptian-style “day of rage” in Damascus on the 8th 
of February. Only a negligible amount of people turned up, all of whom 
were swiftly dispersed by security police. But despite the initial failure, 
in time the network interweaved itself through new media with local 
activists and came to perform certain crucial functions in an activist 
networks that stretches far beyond the borders of Syria. 
Throughout the first weeks of the uprising, some of the main web-
pages, operated primarily by diaspora cyberactivists, were instrumental 
in running the day-to-day operations of the uprising. Fiddaalidin Al-
Sayed Issa, a Sweden-based activist and one of the main players behind 
the Facebook site Syrian Revolution 2011, said in May 2011 that ”we 
guide young people down there. When we called for a Friday 
demonstration, people take to the streets - everyone follows. We 
determine the dates of the demonstrations with the help of people on the 
ground.”43 Local activists in Syria have since become better organized. 
Local Coordination Committees, first formed in Daraa, quickly spread to 
Homs where the organisation has been the most accomplished.44 As the 
uprising wore on, the transnational cyberactivists, who constitute one 
network within the oppositional transnational public, gradually adopted 
a more supportive role of mediating and representing the revolution. 
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Concurrently, various exiled intellectuals and human rights activists 
acted as spokespersons for the revolution and as the point of call for 
international media, NGOs and foreign governments. These actors were 
unconstrained by the very circumstances – repression, immobility, 
communication difficulties – which have forced the internal networks to 
remain organic and leaderless. Moreover, they hold positions in society 
which have granted them certain authority. As one young cyberactivist 
commented, ”I cannot walk into Hillary Clinton’s office. I wouldn’t be 
taken seriously. We need these people [who] act as representatives of 
the revolution”.45 Many of the intellectuals became reluctant 
spokespersons, not hesitant in their commitment to the revolution, but 
uncomfortable appearing to represent a movement which they had 
neither instigated nor controlled.  
Another development – in addition to the shift in responsibilities 
from outside to inside in the day-to-day running of the protests – has 
been a simultaneous increased professionalization and division of labour 
in the cyberactivist networks. They are now divided into smaller units, 
each with a designated set of tasks. Some sort through the enormous 
amount of incoming information and images which can range between 
1000-5000 messages per day. If the information or images originate 
from a secure source, they are immediately published on the main web-
pages (which include Syrian Revolution 2011). If not, they must be 
verified by local trusted sources. Other teams deal directly with the 
international media, responding to questions, facilitating contacts 
between foreign journalists and local activists, and writing press 
releases. Moreover, some groups directed hacker attacks towards the 
Syrian Ministry of Defence and against the website of the first lady 
Asma al-Asad, among other targets.46 Fearing an Egypt-style internet 
closure, activists also smuggled in around 100 satellite phones, modems, 
cameras and laptops during the early stages of the uprising.47  
Many activists emphasize trust as important in solidifying networks. 
For example, in these circles, not being able to return to the homeland 
signifies both their genealogies of activism and their level of 
commitment. A core network was established among those who were 
active from the start, before the revolution got underway, and who have 
been able to build relationships across borders.48 Abdulsattar Attar, an 
activist based in Belgium, notes that “every one of these activists knows 
two or three trustworthy sources in different towns and villages across 
the country. In all, we’re in contact with thousands of Syrians.”49 By 
delegating enormous amounts of cumbersome work, they offloaded a 
huge number of tasks from local activists, who can then focus on other 
activities. Thus, in all these ways – division of labour, 
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professionalization, and the consolidation and building of trust – a 
network of transnational cyberactivists was configured online and 
offline which was instrumental in supporting the uprising during the 
early stages in a variety of ways.50  
Sites: Syrian Revolution 2011 
The oppositional transnational public operate on multiple sites in and 
out of cyberspace, including blogs, Skype, Facebook community sites, 
discussion fields on various websites, chatrooms etc. One example will 
be taken up here: the Facebook website Syrian Revolution 2011. The site 
which had by September 2011 amassed over 300,000 followers was the 
centrepiece of the Syrian transnational cyberactivists.51 Activists 
themselves claim that the website was visited over 11 million times 
every day. In May 2011, it was estimated that the site’s users were 
comprised of about 35% Syrian nationals residing in Syria, 50% from 
the Syrian diaspora around the world while the remaining 15% were 
mainly other Arabs in other Arab countries, figures illustrating the 
immense presence of the diaspora in the virtual anti-regime spaces.52 
The Facebook page was run by around 20-25 operators with 400 
activists in the wider support-network, 100-150 of whom are from the 
diaspora. In the early stages of the uprising, the statements it produced 
several times a day effectively translated into semi-official policy for the 
revolution. At present, the site is only one among hundreds that have 
sprung up since the uprising started. In addition to Syrian Revolution 
2011 (hereafter: SR2011) there are the Local Coordination Committees 
of Syria, Shaam News Networks, Syrian Days of Rage, The Syrian 
Activists’ Network, With You Syria, to name a few, and a cohort of 
websites which represents local towns and villages throughout Syria.53  
On the SR2011 Facebook website, administrators, most of whom 
are from the diaspora, churn out statements, often accompanied with 
videos, sometimes at a rate of one every second minute. The statements 
range from logistical information for protesters and reports of ongoing 
demonstrations to quotes from articles and grand political declarations in 
the name of the revolution. In the comments field beneath each 
announcement, individuals from the 300,000-strong pool of followers 
(or just anyone with a Facebook account) opine, discuss and reflect over 
the administrators’ statements, roughly at a rate of 30-100 comments on 
each statement. Users can also choose to “like” the statement, 
expressing their approval of a statement’s content. Between 100 and 400 
members “like” each statement.  
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The administrators on SR2011 practise special terms of usage. It is 
strictly forbidden to incite violence, attack individuals or to use 
“inappropriate language”. Failure to abide by these rules can result in 
expulsion from the site. On March 24th a "code of ethics against 
sectarianism in Syria” was released, in an attempt to prevent 
revolutionary discourse being tainted by sectarian rhetoric. Intense 
discussions took place over how to take the revolution forward and the 
site for the most part practised interactivity and inclusivity. Before each 
Friday, a poll was held over what the Friday-protests should be called. 
They often carried slogans with political purposes: for example, one 
Friday protest was called Azzadi – the Kurdish word for “Freedom” – in 
an attempt to reach out to the Kurdish community. 
Sites within the transnational public sphere, such as SR2011, very 
much function as public spheres in the Habermasian sense. They fulfil 
the institutional criteria: open access, bracketing of identities (whereby 
location, education, social status and gender are almost always 
concealed), and discussions based on issues pertaining to common 
affairs of all Syrians. But, despite the cyberactivists’ insistence that they 
simply mediate neutral information they are fed from people “on the 
ground”, statements are given meaning in relation to the particular 
context in which it is expressed, and Syrian Revolution 2011 has not 
been immune to charges of carrying sectarian or other exclusivist 
undertones. The latter part of the paper will explore these processes of 
inclusion and exclusion which govern the borders of the oppositional 
transnational public. 
Strategies: Narratives of the Revolution and the Struggle for 
Representation 
As the uprising has progressed, the most central task of the oppositional 
transnational public has been to project certain narratives of the 
revolution to both Syrians and the outside world. In much of the 
scholarship on Syria in recent decades there has been a general 
consensus that the Syrian regime has not ruled by an ideological 
mandate, but rather operated purely on the basis of coercion and neo-
patrimonialism.54 However, a few scholars – most notably Lisa Wedeen 
and Miriam Cook – have illustrated that the workings of Syrian 
authoritarianism have been more complex and have entered the 
ideational realm in subtle ways through disciplinary power and the 
production of knowledge by the regime.55 As Charles Tripp observes of 
Middle Eastern states, power functions as an “imaginative construct, 
shaping ideas of community, and the means whereby collective 
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identities can be protected, and interests furthered”.56 Therefore, 
internally, activism in the oppositional transnational public is as much 
about breaking the imaginative hold that the state exercises over people 
and fragmenting its monopoly over representation of reality as it is about 
dismantling the material structures of the Baathist state. Externally, it is 
about breaking the isolation of the country, exposing injustices, and 
shattering the lingering image of Bashar al-Asad as a reformer. In this 
twin pursuit, representing, writing, capturing, and mediating the 
revolution and constructing it publically to internal and external actors 
become powerful techniques, and these are activities in which the 
transnational public has been integral, if not wholly dominant. This is 
part of a strategy to transnationalize the public sphere and, by doing this, 
break the regime’s hold over the internal symbolic sphere. 
The production and dissemination of narratives of the revolution 
have largely been accomplished through the projection of imagery. 
There is a belief among activists that imagery escapes the inherent bias 
of regular news reporting. Radwan Ziadeh, a liberal intellectual based in 
Washington, argues that “if the Egyptian revolution was the Facebook 
revolution, the Syrian revolution is the Youtube revolution”. Ziadeh sees 
a risk that the revolution, due to the lack of access of international media 
inside Syria, will become a revolution in numbers – number of people 
killed, detained, missing – whereas “personal stories” are being 
overlooked.57 The oppositional transnational public’s task is to provide 
the context – through stories, real people, images – that provides 
meaning to such factual statements.  
Crucially, these narratives reach their audience principally through 
satellite television rather than through social networking. Even though 
the regime lifted its Facebook ban in mid-February 2011 in a bid to 
appease growing discontent, sites such as Syrian Revolution 2011 are 
banned and have to be accessed by circumventing firewalls through 
proxy-servers, a practise in which activists have developed great 
sophistication.58 Moreover, internet connection speed has been slow to 
the extent of making the use of Facebook and Youtube “virtually 
impossible”.59 In 2008, only 16.8% of Syrians had access to the internet, 
compared for example to 48.5% in Iran. A more reliable channel of 
reaching a Syrian audience is indirectly through satellite-channels such 
as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya which broadcasts images published by the 
main opposition websites. The “Al-Jazeera effect” is often overlooked in 
contemporary debates on the role of new media in the Arab revolts in 
favour of the more in vogue “Facebook effect” and “Youtube effects”; 
yet, the satellite channels magnify discourses that emanate from the 
internet platforms by feeding them into their own narratives. 
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 Whereas the Syrian uprising received little attention in Al-Jazeera’s 
broadcasting during its early stages, it has since firmly been placed in 
the “Al-Jazeera narrative” of the people against the dictators. 60 As Mark 
Lynch has noted,  
Events do not speak for themselves. For them to have political 
meaning they need to be interpreted, placed into a particular context 
and imbued with significance. Arabs collectively understood these 
events quite quickly as part of a broader Arab narrative of reform and 
popular protest ---the "Al Jazeera narrative" of an Arab public 
challenging authoritarian Arab regimes and U.S. foreign policy alike.61 
This demonstrates the salience of not divorcing the internet from its 
wider position within the transnational public sphere. The internet, of 
course, has different qualities in that it constitutes a public sphere in 
itself because of its many-to-many communication. But satellite TV-
channels have been wholly dependent on information and images from 
actors inside Syria, the so-called “citizen-journalism” (which is in the 
Syrian uprising more akin to activist-journalism). Disseminating 
information and images has become an integral part of the whole 
oppositional transnational public, much of whose networking is geared 
towards these tasks. It is not only about illuminating their strategies “on 
the ground”, but constitutes a strategy in itself. Without these media 
outlets being willing to mediate stories from inside Syria, the internet 
would be reduced to a logistical network for core activists and a public 
sphere for members of the Syrian diaspora.  
In an upscale neighbourhood in Cairo, renowned British-Syrian 
activist Rami Jarrah has set up a media centre along with a number of 
Syrian activists, with the primary aim of influencing media coverage on 
Syria. The organization, which is called Activists News Association 
(ANA), is partly funded by western NGOs but claims to be politically 
independent.62 The media centre issues daily reports of events in Syria 
which is distributed to international media organizations. According to 
Jarrah, “a lot of the time, news reports are basically copy and paste from 
our reports”. 63 Moreover, the Cairo media centre distributes easy-to-use 
flip cameras to activists inside Syria and offers media training to 
improve the quality of citizen journalism. One aim is to get quality 
footage of demonstrations, especially to provide a counterweight to the 
dominance of footage of violent clashes, “without someone screaming 
Allahu Akbar in the background”, which is then distributed to news 
media.64 The centre is also setting up a radio station which will first 
broadcast online with the future aim to establish terrestrial radio inside 
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Syria. The ANA Cairo media centre is a palpable example of the 
strategies deployed by actors within the oppositional transnational 
public. Such strategies are located in the fissures between the inside and 
the outside and aim to transnationalize the domestic public sphere. 
ANA’s audience consists of both Syrians inside and outside Syria as 
well as a wider international audience. It aims to play an active role by 
asserting its agency in how the conflict is portrayed, thus challenging 
both regime narratives and international media narratives. It helps 
disseminates discourses that all actors – inside and outside – need to 
relate to. Actors within the oppositional transnational public have not 
been immune from accusations of taking advantage of the ambiguous 
informational environment that surrounds the conflict. The internal 
environment in Syria is characterized by the absence of foreign media 
and independent observers. The oppositions’ narrative constructions 
have led to charges that the image of the revolution has been tweaked in 
order to make it more palatable to western audiences. It has been 
claimed, for example, that the role of women is exaggerated and 
communal strife played down.65 Another example is the case of Zainab 
al-Husni who was reported have been brutally killed in detention and, 
through the story’s diffusion by Al-Jazeera, Amnesty International and 
the BBC, quickly became a martyr. Al-Husni later appeared on state 
television, apparently unharmed.66 Moreover, mystery surrounded an 
“intelligence document” which was published on one of the main web-
sites, allegedly outlining the details of the state’s plans for a brutal 
crackdown on dissent. Questions have been raised over its authenticity, 
which has proven impossible to verify.67  
When analyzing these processes of narrative construction, it is 
important to emphasise the contingencies inherent in the formation of 
transnational publics. The way in which new media have been 
conceptualised in the “Arab Spring”, as facilitating the rise of a 
counterhegemonic public sphere, very much reflects the one-
dimensional view of the public sphere envisioned by Habermas. Walter 
Armbrust has situated such concern within the “’the mania for 
newness’” which is “structured, implicitly, by an old and familiar 
concern for politics that structures much of Middle Eastern Studies ... to 
construct a democratic public sphere or undermine it.”68 A transnational 
public is not, by definition, counterhegemonic and subversive, but can 
itself inhabit power which may generate new forms of resistance.69 
Building on Gramsci, Fraser claims that “the official public sphere, then, 
was – indeed, is – the prime institutional site for the construction of the 
consent that defines the new, hegemonic mode of domination”70 Thus it 
is important not to test practices against the predetermined linear 
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trajectory towards democracy and inclusivity but to be attuned to the 
contingencies that govern these trajectories in the formation of 
transnational publics. While the oppositional transnational public have 
been remarkably successful in their media operations, and while the new 
media has facilitated this dissemination, it is important to emphasise the 
ways in which these operations are bound up with specific political 
strategies located in their effort to transnationalize the public sphere. 
Mutual Transformations of the Transnational and the Local  
When examining transnational processes in relation to the Syrian 
uprising, the “outside” can never be detached from the “inside”. 
Transnational publics transgress physical space and the local and the 
transnational – the “inside” and the “outside” – are mutually 
transformed in the process. Such intertwinement is partly inherent in the 
medium of the internet, which, as Saskia Sassen notes, is a technology 
that “is partly embedded in actual societal structures and power 
dynamics: its topography weaves in and out of non-electronic space”.71 
Consequently, the local and the global become increasingly intertwined 
in a process Roland Robertson has called “glocalization”.72 
In the case of Syria, part of the transnationalization of the public 
sphere is the incorporation of both external and internal actors – 
protestors on the street, activists etc. – within it. As Guidry et al. states 
in their survey on the transnational public sphere:  
One should attend to the variety of ways in which social movements 
enter the transnational public space, are potentially transformed by the 
encounter, and perhaps even influence globalizations themselves. That 
is to say, the transnational public sphere renders the global and local 
mutually transformative. Social movements as a whole – their objects, 
participants, leaders, and analysts – are all part of this process.73 
The transnationalization of the public sphere described above engenders 
a global gaze under which protests are performed. In this sense, the 
protests are part of a performativity which stages them according to 
specific political strategies informed by the discourses of resistance on 
the one hand and directed towards national and transnational audiences 
on the other. Therefore, events “on the ground” are not only reflected 
neutrally to the outside world via new media; this gaze fundamentally 
transforms the strategies of protestors in the first place, an example of 
how the local and the transnational become mutually transformative.  
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One such specific strategy is the use of so called “flying 
demonstrations”, a type of flash protest whereby people gather at a 
predetermined location for a very short period of time, just long enough 
to film the demonstrations, only to disperse again, thus avoiding a 
response from the security police.74 Videos are then disseminated, often 
via transnational cyberactivists, to various news networks. Another way 
in which this transnational gaze alters the strategies is the overt political 
messages displayed at demonstrations. When Russia and China vetoed 
tougher sanctions against the Asad regime in the UN Security Council, 
for example, protestors trampled on large Russian and Chinese flags in 
an act of overt defiance.75 Journalist Nir Rosen, moreover, observes an 
instance in Ramel, a neighbourhood in Latakia, where a big screen was 
set up during a protest showing Al-Jazeera’s live footage of 
demonstrations all around Syria. When the screen turned to the Ramel 
crowd, “the crowd went wild, jumping, clapping and shouting, singing 
loudly in unison, shooting more fireworks into the air”.76 Online and 
offline practises, external and internal strategies, are all intertwined. An 
organisation, the Syrian Non-Violence Movement, which promotes civil 
disobedience, distributed small packages in the streets of Syria with 
Facebook messages from the online forums.77 On twitter, activists have 
launched the #EyesonSyria campaign to maintain the transnational gaze. 
Thus, the transnationalization of the public sphere transforms and 
appropriates all actors involved in the Syrian uprising, including the 
state, to which we will now turn.  
The Deterritorialization of the Syrian state  
The Syrian uprising, by unleashing multiple communicative capacities, 
represents a forceful transnationalization of Syrian politics, a process 
resisted by the regime and those loyal to it. The response has manifested 
itself both in the ideational realm, by casting the oppositional 
transnational public as a conspiracy and by reinforcing the distinction 
between the “inside” and the “outside”, as well as by targeted measures, 
such as cracking down on dissidents abroad and launching various kinds 
of cyberwarfare. The regime, although occasionally hapless in dealing 
with the new media, has demonstrated awareness in dealing with the 
transnationalization of the public sphere, which it recognises as a potent, 
if not existential, threat. One strategy is to cast itself as the subject of a 
grand conspiracy partly manifested in “media wars” and “virtual wars”. 
In his first speech after the uprising began, Bashar Al-Asad said:  
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And I am sure you all know that Syria is facing a great conspiracy 
whose tentacles extend to some nearby countries and far-away 
countries, with some inside the country. This conspiracy depends, in 
its timing not in its form, on what is happening in other Arab countries 
[…] 
Some satellite T.V. stations actually spoke about attacking certain 
buildings an hour before they were actually attacked. How did they 
know that? Do they read the future? This happened more than once. 
Then, things started to become clearer. They will say that we believe 
in the conspiracy theory. In fact there is no conspiracy theory. There is 
a conspiracy [...] 
In the beginning they started with incitement, many weeks before 
trouble started in Syria. They used the satellite T.V. stations and the 
internet but did not achieve anything. And then, using sedition, started 
to produce fake information, voices, images, etc. they forged 
everything.  
It is a virtual war…They want us to incur a virtual defeat but using 
different methods.78 
Counterrevolutionaries have a clear presence on the internet, although 
they are not as coherent and sophisticated as the oppositional 
transnational public. Mirroring the regime’s discursive tactics, several 
regime-loyal actors on the net have elaborated on the alleged conspiracy. 
Websites have sprung up that seek to uncover “the plot against Syria”. 
On these sites, one of which is called ‘TrashSyria’, the extent of such a 
plot is laid out in a conspiratorial manner linking famous transnational 
cyberactivists, such as Fiddaldin Issa and Rami Nakhle, to regime critics 
such as Abdulhalim Khaddam, the former Vice President, and Michel 
Kilo, a veteran Christian dissident.79 Even more astounding are the 
claims that the plot is spearheaded by a random cohort of disparate 
Jewish and/or American actors such as AIPAC, US diplomat Jeffery 
Feltman, and the French philosopher Bernard Henri-Levy. On the 
TrashSyria website, users can choose to virtually ‘spit on’, ‘mark as 
toxic waste’ or ‘dump’ the Syrian activists, dissidents, and opposition 
leaders whose profiles are displayed on the site, mirroring the often 
disturbingly unsavoury rhetoric of the regime. 
Another strategy designed to counteract the oppositional 
transnational public is the emphasis regime discourse put on the 
dichotomy between “inside” and “outside”. Bashar Al-Asad makes this 
distinction very clear:  
The first (group) constitute a part of our national component and all of 
the demands I heard from them were raised underneath the national 
umbrella. They had no foreign agenda and no foreign connections. 
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They were against any foreign intervention under any pretext, asking 
to engage, however, rather than be marginalized. They wanted justice 
[…] 
The latter are a small group. It is true that they made an impact; they 
tried to manipulate others. They tried to manipulate the good majority 
of the Syrian people in order to achieve different purposes. 
Differentiating between the two groups is very important […] 
There are people who are well paid to carry out video cameras, film 
and collaborate with the media…They distorted the country’s image in 
the outside world and opened the way, and even called for, foreign 
intervention.80 
Producing and maintaining the appearance of a distinction is itself a 
mechanism that generates resources of power. But the state has also 
directed direct attacks against sites and actors who constitute the 
oppositional transnational pubic. One weapon used is the Syrian 
Electronic Army (SEA). This group is closely connected to, if not 
directly instigated by, the regime. Information Warfare Monitor, a 
research institute at the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of 
Toronto, found that the SEA’s website was registered by the Syrian 
Computer Society and its servers hosted by a branch of the same 
organisation. This is the same computer society that was headed by 
Bashar al-Asad during the 1990s and founded by his brother Bassel al-
Asad.81 President al-Asad himself mentioned the Syrian Electronic 
Army in his 3rd speech after the start of the uprising on the 20th of 
June 2011.82 Its purpose is to attack websites that spread news hostile to 
the Syrian regime and to combat “the fabrication on the facts of events 
in Syria”.83 The SEA has used so-called defacement, stripping a website 
of its content and replacing it with political messages, and spamming 
attacks. One instrument that it uses is the so-called Denial of Service 
tools, designed specifically to obstruct certain users from accessing the 
websites of Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya, BBC News, and Orient TV, a 
Syrian satellite broadcaster.84  
A second tactic has been to use the regime’s network of embassies 
and other regime-loyal actors to suppress dissidents abroad. Fiddaaldin 
Issa, a cyberactivist, noted that “as an activist, I have had many 
problems with the regime. They have named me on television several 
times, they say that I’m no longer a Syrian, that I have betrayed my 
country. They have phoned me and sent letters saying that they know 
where I live, what my wife and my son’s names are.”85 Such stories are 
not uncommon. Sometimes the security services clamp down on net 
activists abroad by forcing detained protestors inside Syria to open their 
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Facebook accounts and reveal their network of friends.86 Threatening 
messages are then sent to cyberactivists around the world.  
During a protest in Paris on the 26th of August, several 
demonstrators were attacked by a group of nine men, several of whom 
had diplomatic passports according to French police.87 Amnesty 
International also recounts the case of Malek Jandali, a Syrian-American 
composer who performed at an anti-regime rally in Washington. Four 
days later his parents were violently assaulted by security agents in their 
homes in Damascus.88 The list goes on and on. In October 2011, a 
Syrian-born American, Mohamad Soueid, was charged with spying on 
US activists who oppose the Damascus government. According to the 
indictment, Soueid, who had allegedly met president al-Asad in June 
2011, sent 20 video and audio recordings of protests in the US to the 
mukhabaraat between April and June 2011.89 Throughout North 
America and Europe these activities have been widespread.  
This demonstrates how the transnationalization of the public sphere, 
a strategy pushed by the oppositional transnational public, has been 
counteracted by the state and elements loyal to it. Even if these tactics 
are harsh and disturbing, it is too simplistic to proclaim, as some 
commentators have, this struggle to be a battle of ”light vs. darkness, 
openness vs. secrecy, transparency vs. anonymity, and old media vs. 
new media.”90 What is certain, however, is that these processes have led 
to a fragmentation and polarisation which has left many Syrians, inside 
and outside of the country, to reject both the regime and the oppositional 
transnational public. 
Fragmentation in the Transnational Public Sphere:  
Exclusion and Inclusion 
The formation of the current opposition has led to a transnationalization 
of the public sphere, in which Syrians can debate topics unthinkable 
only a year ago. Sites such as Syrian Revolution 2011 practise 
Habermasian “rational” forms of debate, and inclusivity and openness 
are the norm. Through the complex network of narrative dissemination, 
the regime’s stranglehold on the symbolic sphere and the informational 
environment has been broken. However, the opposition had by the end 
of 2011 failed to reach a critical mass and to sway what is commonly 
labelled the “silent majority”. Activists and opposition members make 
sense of this failure in two ways. One is by pointing towards the fear 
factor, the harsh repression by the security services. The other way is by 
invoking a kind of false consciousness logic, arguing that people are 
deluded by the regime’s propaganda machine. Ayman Abdel Nour, 
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editor in chief of the All4Syria news website, sums up this view: “we 
have a silent majority that does not know the truth, and even if they try 
to know they will reject the truth out of fear”.91 
While the new media offers sites for the formation and 
consolidation of imagined communities, such an arena, with its inherent 
multi-polarity, also lends itself to fragmentation of imagined 
communities. This goes for both inside and outside Syria. Journalist 
Anthony Shadid notes that “in Alawite villages, only government 
television is watched. To do so in Sunni neighborhoods amounts to 
treason. There, Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya are the stations of choice.”92 
For a long time, the monied classes in Aleppo and Damascus, moreover, 
are able to live in oblivion to what is going on in the country.93 Internet 
forums and chat sites are awash with Youtube videos showing either 
pro-government demonstrations in Damascus or oppositional protests, 
usually from Homs or Hama, supposedly reinforcing their argument 
about what is “actually” going on in Syria. The bracketing of identities, 
moreover, may lead to, what Jon Anderson calls a lack of “civility in the 
vernacular”, which further polarises public opinion.94 
As has been shown, the activist networks within the oppositional 
transnational public have been successful in promoting their narratives 
of revolution, which have locked into the ‘Al-Jazeera narrative’ of Arab 
peoples against repressive dictators. But the binary nature of this 
narrative runs the risk of excluding more ambiguous and ambivalent 
interpretations of the conflict. In the process large segments of Syrians – 
inside and outside of the country –who do not share the fervour of the 
revolutionaries have felt excluded.  
By operating through new media rather than in real life situations, 
the oppositional transnational public can act unitarily as a public. New 
media also facilitate non-hierarchical organisations which mobilise 
people around an abstract idea rather than, for example, a charismatic 
leader. The opposition has been strongest when disembedded from 
“real” space. International pressure to organise formally – culminating 
in the formation of the Syrian National Council – undermines the appeal 
to universal values that have underpinned the wider oppositional 
transnational public by reifying such values in individuals and groups 
which embody certain sectarian, political and other identities. The often 
sincere efforts by the oppositional transnational public to reach out to 
various communities have been undermined by the broader process of 
fragmentation and polarisation evident in the transnational public 
sphere. Thus the transnationalization of the public sphere, and the state’s 
efforts to counteract it, polarise public opinion and fragment imagined 
communities. In between remain nuances, grey zones often labelled ‘the 
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silent majority’, which constitute a variety of Syrians, inside and outside 
Syria, who are mobilised by neither of these discourses.  
All actors involved – the state, the opposition, the cyberactivists – 
are part of such fragmentation. The new media landscape, which partly 
constitutes the transnational public sphere – its inherent plurality, many-
to-many characteristics, and user-generated content (even in the case of 
satellite television) – facilitates such fragmentation. It is now easier than 
ever to operate in distinct, yet coherent, information and ideational 
environments. As Guidry et al. argues:  
The coherence of a common public sphere that invites multiple publics 
to participate is, however, a difficult concept to grasp. Without the 
unity afforded by the nation it appears nearly impossible. The symbol 
of the nation and the ideology of national self-interest enables a 
common public sphere within nation-states to be imaginable. A 
postmodern sensibility of difference undermines the ease with which 
the communality of that national public sphere can be imagined. It is 
even more difficult to imagine a transnational public sphere that has 
no global imaginary uniting the variety of publics constituting it.95 
Thus, the transnationalization of the public sphere undermines the kind 
of “reading together” that Benedict Anderson identified as integral in the 
formation of imagined communities, and by extension, nation-states.96 It 
follows naturally, then, that the transnationalization of the public sphere 
itself is a political strategy by the oppositional transnational public, one 
that the state tries to counteract.  
Conclusion 
This paper has traced the formation of an oppositional transnational 
public within the transnational public sphere where dichotomies of 
offline and online, and inside and outside are blurred. Whereas there has 
been a gap between the external formal opposition, such as the SNC, 
and protesters inside Syria, other external oppositional networks, such as 
the cyberactivists, have been embedded in networks consisting of inside 
and outside actors thus transgressing the national territory of Syria. In 
the Syrian uprising, processes of transnationalism render the strategies 
of the local and the transnational mutually transformed. Within the 
oppositional transnational public, new sets of actors, sites and strategies 
overlap with protestors and activists inside Syria. In a struggle located in 
the realm of representation, narratives of the revolution have 
successfully been disseminated through sophisticated networks of 
activists which transcend national boundaries. In response, the regime 
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has had to deterritorialize the state in order to deal with the threats posed 
by the transnational strategies of the oppositional public. The 
transnational public sphere does not function as a unitary public sphere 
as Habermas envisioned. Instead, it reflects – as well as underpins – in a 
dialectical process, a fragmentation and polarisation, of transnational 
publics rooted in imagined communities. The inclusivity, debates over 
common concern, and status bracketing practised within the oppositional 
transnational public are predicated on a priori processes of inclusion and 
exclusion that make such coherence possible in the first place.  
Thus, in times of turmoil, like the present one in Syria, the struggle 
over transnationalization provides the backdrop against which formerly 
stable identities are set in flux, configurations of power and influence 
are renegotiated and imagined communities reimagined. The 
transnationalization of the public sphere has redrawn patterns of identity 
and belonging. Whereas these spaces go a long way towards 
transcending established boundaries between class, gender, social status, 
political allegiance and sects, they are strictly ordered according to a 
new binary of regime supporters and critics. 
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Celebrity Politics in Troubled Times: 
The Case of Muna Wassef1 
Helena Nassif 
Introduction 
Visiting Damascus in June 2011 three months into the start of the 
domestic unrest, I was at a friend’s place when asked whether I knew 
about a women-only protest that had taken place in the streets of Al-
Midan, a Damascene neighbourhood, with protestors chanting “Umm 
Joseph… Umm Joseph.”2 Out of all the television characters played by 
Muna Wassef, one of the most famous contemporary Syrian actresses, 
the interest of this case study focuses on her role in the popular 
television series Bab el-Hara (The Neighbourhood Gate) seasons four 
and five as Umm Joseph3 juxtaposing this fictional role with her real life 
experience during the first months of the uprising. The fictitious heroic 
character Umm Joseph has been the subject of multiple controversies 
and has been criticized for not being “real,” by both critics and the 
public.4 The character is best revealed in a short description of the 
closing scene of Bab el-Hara season five. The camera pans on all the 
neighbourhood men standing in a semi-circle addressing moral 
messages to the traitor before his public execution. To the side of the 
majority male crowd, Umm Joseph with her face visible and a cross to 
her chest stands with a group of women with their faces covered. Before 
the men start shooting, Umm Joseph hands her gun to the spy’s wife 
who publicly asks for divorce and shoots the first bullet in revenge. The 
scene ends with Umm Joseph shouting “Oh people, a country whose 
women’s and men’s hands are clutched together, will have its head held 
up high with no one able to reach it.” The significance of studying the 
case of Muna Wassef and discussing the character of Umm Joseph stems 
from the fact that the women who took to the streets of al-Midan 
neighbourhood in Damascus in 2011 were specifically chanting the 
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name of a fictitious character "Umm Joseph." The drama text in this 
case provides the entry point to study the political.  
The beginning of the Syrian protests in March 2011 led to a division 
in the country between regime loyalists and the opposition. This division 
was reflected in the position of popular television stars whose public 
image became vulnerable to accusations of treason. Wassef, together 
with more than one hundred workers in the television drama industry, 
signed a Call asking the Syrian troops to allow goods to reach 
“besieged” children in a Syrian border town. The call was evaluated as 
“anti-patriotic,” and many production houses threatened to boycott the 
signatories. In the case of Wassef, who was accused of treason, I look at 
how tensions over public expressions of loyalty reflect the conflict over 
defining and claiming the state.  
The description which follows narrates the events that took place 
after the release of the Call during May 2011 so as to, first, investigate 
the context that led Wassef’s fictional role to impose "the promise" of 
the hero over her everyday life and, second, to document the 
connections between celebrities and processes of negotiating patriotism 
during the beginning of the conflict (May-July 2011).5 This case study 
focuses on how the accusation of treason against one star actress can 
provide initial insight into the complex public struggle over of the 
Syrian state during the uprising.  
Television Stars, Humanitarian Calls and the Politics of Loyalty 
At the end of April 2011, more than one month into the protests, a 
petition dubbed the “Urgent Call to the Syrian Government for the 
Children of Daraa” (or the “Call for Milk” as named by the pro-regime 
loyalists) was signed by Muna Wassef along with more than 100 artists, 
media personalities and scriptwriters. The petition asked the Syrian 
government to allow the passage of milk to children in the “besieged” 
southern city Daraa.6 Loyalists saw the Call as “anti-regime” 
propaganda, as it wrongly accused the army of blockading the city, 
while “pro-demonstration” intellectuals were unhappy with its language 
evaluating it as apolitical, not courageous enough and not calling the 
problem by its name.7 Despite the “humane” language of the one-
paragraph Call, loyalists accused it of crossing the line that safeguards 
the image of the national army as the protector of the people. Rima 
Fleihan, scriptwriter and the author of the call, came under a great deal 
of pressure as a result of her initiative, and saw her reputation smeared, 
which led her to retract the Call under the pretext that the signatories did 
not have enough information about the situation of children in Daraa. 
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The “Call” triggered a number of debates on various media outlets 
including public and private television channels that hosted loyalist 
actors who publicly supported the government stance. The shows invited 
artists to condemn their “disloyal” colleagues for taking the “pro-
demonstrators” position. In Arabic, an accusation of treason has a 
specific word, at-takhween. At-takhween is not a legal accusation per se, 
as much as a discursive one that aims to delegitimize the political 
position of the accused. At the same time, at-takhween is a pejorative 
word that is used against the process itself, making the accusation seem 
trivial. Intellectuals and journalists criticized the at-takhween process 
and attacked what they called a culture of takhween (accusation of 
treason). 
Early in May 2011, one program on Syrian public television hosted 
Muna Wassef along with two female actresses Yara Sabri and Kinda 
Alloush, one male actor/diector Maher Slaibi and one female director 
Rasha Sharbatji who had all signed the Call.8 Wassef stated that she was 
not mistaken but misunderstood and apologized if she had been 
misunderstood. She specified that she was defending her patriotism and 
not herself as an individual or citizen. She was wearing the Syrian flag 
on the left lapel of her black jacket and talking with enthusiasm. 
Following her equivocal justification, the host asked accusingly whether 
signatories had intended to abuse their position as stars or the people’s 
appreciation of their art and continued, “the Call was translated into four 
languages, too bad it was translated into four languages, even the Israeli 
media has discussed this Call and maybe it was taken as a document by 
other channels and human rights organizations, how can we reply to 
this?”9  
The anchor’s use of the word Israel was enough to put the artists on 
the defensive. His role provides an example of what Wedeen (1999) 
regards as "disciplinary-symbolic power" where lines of demarcation 
between ruler and ruled are complex and shifting for the anchor, once 
ruled, is in the studio context playing the ruler (p.150). His interrogating 
style led the stars participating in the program to dissociate themselves 
from any misuse of the Call by foreign powers. The anchor was 
repeating similar accusations found in various articles online or in posts 
and groups on Facebook accusing the artists of treason.  
On the 14th of May, approximately two weeks after the Call was 
published, president al-Asad met with a number of celebrity artists. 
According to Wassef, he rejected all accusations of treason and stressed 
that each of the artists’ actions was rooted in their patriotic loyalty.10 
Wassef appreciated the president’s consideration for artists, but still 
thought that his intervention came after harm had already been done. 
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She was deeply hurt by the accusations that had come after a fifty-year 
career filled with flattery, part of which was from the ruling regime and 
its institutions. For instance, in 2009 she received the Syrian Order of 
Merit-Excellent from President Bashar al-Asad, acclaiming her role in 
serving her country through Syrian and Arab Television and Cinema. 
The press celebrated Wassef when she was honoured by the ruling 
party’s youth association in March 2010.11 
Meeting with the president did not put an end to at-takhween 
practices. On the 22nd of May 2011, the private pro-regime channel Al-
Dunia, hosted actors Bassem Yakhuor, Abbas al-Nouri, Amal Arafa, 
Fahd el-Abed and director Seif Eddine Sibai who did not sign the Call, 
and did not contradict the regime’s discourse but tried to avoid accusing 
their colleagues of treason. The anchor contacted Rima Fleihan by 
phone to talk to fellow artists in the studio and she was accusingly asked 
to explain why she had taken the decision to write the Call. She read a 
press release where she confirmed that she was not ready to work with 
any “foreign entity,” she apologized for what might have been 
misunderstood and emphasized that she had written the Call with, “the 
best of intentions in a moment of high emotion" driven by a "sense of 
motherhood, without thinking that the Call would have been abused, 
distorted and exaggerated.”12  
"Accusing the Artists of Treason: The Series is on and with Great 
Success," was the title of one article in the press in Lebanon following 
the airing of the public television chat show.13 The Syrian writer 
criticized the accusation process (at-takhween) that had divided the 
artists into traitors and patriots. He scrutinized the new standards of 
patriotism and asked whether the famous television drama series director 
Najdat Anzour was setting these standards. Anzour had initiated a 
statement during early May 2011, signed by Syrian production houses, 
to boycott the artists who had signed the “Urgent Call to the Syrian 
Government for the Children of Daraa”. The campaign’s statement was 
signed by twenty-two production houses including ‘Aaj Production, the 
producer of the first two seasons of Bab el-Hara. The declaration 
accused the “Call” to have been based on the “fabricated claims of 
unknown witnesses and activists in suspicious foreign circles.” It added 
that the signatories should have contacted the Ministries of Economy 
and Health to check on the food supplies available in Daraa before 
signing a Call written in the “US Facebook circles known for their 
blatant hostility to our country and all it represents.” Israel was also 
mentioned in the statement that “draws the attention” of the signatories 
to the fact that the bullets fired at the army are “Israeli bullets par 
excellence.”14  
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Director and producer Haitham Haqqi, one of the main founders of 
the Syrian television drama industry, was keen to be amongst those who 
took a strong stance against Anzour’s statement. He denounced it in an 
article published under the title “Those Alien Attitudes” where he 
refused all accusations or threats against artists' livelihood.15 Haqqi’s 
article was one among a number of other articles in the Syrian online 
press, which reported on the production houses’ statement and on the 
alleged demand that Muna Wassef be stripped of the Syrian Order of 
Merit that she had been awarded by President al-Asad in 2009. The 
sentence asking to strip Wassef of the medal was however missing from 
the published text signed by the production houses. It is difficult to 
assess whether the sentence had been originally included in the written 
statement, or simply was rumoured to be so. 
In an alleged interview, Anzour stated that the production houses 
had intended to teach the artists who had signed the Call “a lesson.”16 
He added that they would not boycott the artists after the latter 
apologized, “they are our friends and it is not personal.” Thus, Anzour 
drew a line between the public and private and by defining the issue as 
public he requested the popular artists to take a clear position. Similarly 
to the anchor in the context of the studio, he was playing the role of the 
ruler trying to enforce compliance upon artists. The case of Muna 
Wassef provides an example of how the public expression of a star was 
believed to be politically significant leading to its containment.  
Muna Wassef the Star 
Muna Wassef (1942), a self-made professional actress who is recognised 
to have succeeded as a result of her talent and achievement might be the 
most acclaimed female star in Syria with a fan base that extends across 
the Arab world. Her filmography includes Moustapha Akkad’s classic 
‘The Message’.17 She began her career as a model when she was 
seventeen years old, then joined the Military Institution Theatre when 
she was eighteen. She got married to the Syrian film director 
Muhammad Shahin, who died in 2003, and gave birth to one child 
Ammar, who is one of the dissident voices in exile.  
Syrian novelist and scriptwriter, Khaled Khalifeh, divided the artists 
into those indebted to the regime for their fame and those self-made.18 
For the former, he used the term “consecrated” in Arabic to explain how 
certain artists became successful irrespective of their talents. The 
regime, he continued, expected loyalty from all artists. The links 
between the owners of the production houses and the political 
establishment are difficult to map but not impossible to establish. Out of 
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the eleven main businessmen whom the opposition accuses of benefiting 
from and serving the status quo, three are well known to have had a 
hand in the development of the drama industry. The son of Abdul Halim 
Khaddam, ex-deputy president who defected from the regime in 2005, 
owned el-Cham International for Cinema and Television Production. 
The company was one of the first private production houses of the 
nineties, closed after the family escaped to Paris. Mohammad Hamsho 
owns Syria International for Art Production, a major production house in 
the country, and Majd Suleiman, the son of a former high- ranking army 
commander, owns United Group that organizes a yearly Oscar-like prize 
“Adonia” which holds tributes to the Syrian Drama and the efforts of its 
creative personnel (2004-2010).  
Rojek (2001) differentiates between three forms of celebrity status; 
the “ascribed” (lineage-dependent), “achieved” (accomplishment-
dependent) and “attributed” (media representation dependent) which he 
calls “celetoids” (p. 18-19). In his analysis he does not give special 
attention to the role of the state in creating media hype. In contrast, 
Khalifeh does not highlight the role of the media, but that of the state, in 
attributing the consecrated celebrity.19 In the context of Syria, it is 
important to mention that the status achieved/attributed is not only 
dependent on the perceived accomplishments or media exposure of the 
star but his/her relation with the security apparatus and the rewards 
gained as a result of this relation. “Muna Wassef comes from another 
time,” Khalifeh insists. Her fame, he explains, has been achieved 
“before the rise of the Gulf funded Syrian drama” of the last two 
decades, which allowed for the development of the “attributed” celebrity 
status. Khalifeh mentions Wassef’s “memorable roles,” her dedication to 
acting and her knowledge of the craft before it became a good business. 
All of these can explain why she was able to resist offering her “full 
loyalty,” according to Khalifeh.20 
When talking about her attitude towards the on-going events Wassef 
did not clearly mention whether she was anti or pro-regime, but 
specified that she was pro-reform:21  
Irrespective of the problem I faced, the country remains the most 
important thing. When I played the part of Umm Joseph I believed in 
something, not only Umm Joseph but all my roles during the last fifty 
years, that for me, Syria is a red line. This is my country and whatever 
happens, I am not ready to leave, you know, God forbid if anything 
happens, I won’t leave, this is my conviction exactly like that of Umm 
Joseph, she has something that resembles me. If other people leave, I 
stay with insistence. I mean I can’t love the country when it’s strong 
and leave it when it’s wounded. … During the last few years, when I 
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played the character of a strong woman, it was because I wanted to 
feel stronger internally, because they used to challenge me ‘what 
would the beautiful coquette achieve’! And then I proved to be 
successful. I chose roles that made me stronger, my general knowledge 
and my theatre experience all helped make me who I am. ... I am with 
reform and with what has happened [meaning the protests] but without 
reaching the stage of wounding the country. So no human is killed, so 
I don’t witness blood either from the protesters or from the army or 
police, so we do not reach the phase we are in. I mean I am falling in 
love with Syria more and more. I have seen a lot, I am not young, I 
have seen those who have been displaced when they left their 
countries, I have seen when the Americans entered Iraq, where is Iraq 
now? In the end this is not the way problems are solved, this is what I 
believe in. In a way, it resembles my roles but when they ask where is 
Umm Joseph they are asking me to be more, they are asking me to be 
Umm Joseph the one on the screen, but it is too much, and I am not, 
not, not Umm Joseph.  
During the whole interview, Wassef celebrated an idealised 
representation of homeland and disregarded the view of Syria as 
equivalent to the president. She considered Syria itself to be a “red line” 
- its problems being more important than her own. She stressed that 
whatever happens, she would not leave and compared herself to Umm 
Joseph who had “something that resembles her … the attachment to the 
house that harbours the photos of members of the family who are gone.”  
Wedeen (1999) mentions an incident when Wassef, “Syria’s most 
famous actress, declared to her television audience that it was raining – a 
welcome occurrence in desert regions – because Syrians were holding a 
referendum reaffirming their loyalty and allegiance to Hafiz al-Asad.” 
(p.39). Capitalising on her past declared loyalty to the regime, Wassef 
mentions, during the only television interview she gave after signing the 
Call, her volunteer role during the 1973 war and how artists were invited 
by late president Hafez al-Asad and thanked for being “soldiers inside 
the country and not on the border.”22 Although Wassef surely fulfils the 
criteria of an “achieved” celebrity, in a sense she could not escape being 
part of what Khalifeh criticizes; the regime's role in “consecrating” 
television stars into “national symbols.”23 Her past expressions of 
loyalty to the regime, even if or when discrepant from privately held 
belief, complexifies the use of these set statuses. The blurring of these 
forms of celebrity statuses and their inability to provide a meaningful 
explanation of Wassef's political positionality requires a different type of 
investigation that examines how the meanings of state, regime and 
country interfere in how Wassef and other stars situate or are situated as 
“insiders” or “traitors” within the public sphere.  
88    The Syrian Uprising 
Implicating Fiction in Protest  
Talking about Umm Joseph, Wassef, who is born to a Syrian Christian 
mother and a Syrian Kurdish Muslim father, explains:  
The designer and I were able to develop her distinct looks. She 
shouldn’t resemble any of the neighbourhood women … She should 
look Christian and I added the human touch based on the modes of 
speech used by Christian women like referring to Jesus and the Virgin 
Mary that they use and I use since my mother’s upbringing has 
affected me … Umm Joseph resembles the woman I want [to be] in 
life, I mean I am not the subservient type to start with and neither was 
my mother … I loved (Umm Joseph) because she was courageous and 
because she was noble. I loved her because the reality of the situation 
in Syria is that all sects are together. I have not seen, in my long life, 
conflict between Christians and Muslims. I witness this coexistence 
and believe in its message that this character wants to deliver.  
When I asked Muna Wassef about the anti-regime women-only protest 
in Al-Midan, chanting “Umm Joseph,” she smiled and asked her sister 
who was sitting with us whether she knew about it. She then asked me 
whether I had seen the Al-Jazeera report comparing her life stances to 
those of her fictional role.24 The audience “wanted to make me a 
heroine!” she added. As if the protestors used “Umm Joseph” as a 
borrowed element from one story used to tell another story. Umm 
Joseph is not an ordinary character, but that of a strong independent 
woman who participates together with men in armed struggle against the 
French army. Informants in Damascus explained that the Christian name 
(Umm Joseph) was raised in a predominantly Muslim neighbourhood 
(al-Midan) as a means to call Syrian Christians to join the protests or to 
highlight the unity of Syrians across sectarian divides. There are other 
possible explanations however here I would argue that by chanting 
“Umm Joseph,” it is as if the protestors had liberated a fragment from 
the dominant discourse and infused it into everyday life. In other words, 
they released the fictional character from its discursive ensemble thus 
confronting the power of the screen and reclaiming the power to recount 
the narrative. Umm Joseph, and not Muna Wassef, was called for in the 
protest. The women chanting were celebrating the actress' role as if 
aiming to repossess lifeworld stories packaged as discourse (De Certeau 
1984). To call out to Umm Joseph at that moment in time was to 
redefine the “patriotic.”  
The weaving of the personal as political with the fictitious is also 
evident in the way the director of Bab el-Hara season five, Mo’men 
Malla, worked with Wassef. He allowed her to improvise lines into the 
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dialogue for example in one scene Umm Joseph with her eyes swollen 
with tears whispered: “the strange land (el-ghorbeh) has eaten my 
children.” In the interview, Wassef added, “my son is also living in exile 
(ghorbeh).” The interpolation of Wassef’s lived emotions and 
experience into her fictional character and the affective meaning 
attached to the Arabic word “ghorbeh” (translated to strange land or 
expatriation) might help explain the power of her utterance in the 
fictional role. But, what if this “lost” child is accused of treason? Muna 
Wassef is not the mother of Joseph but the mother of Ammar whose 
loyalty is made suspect.  
Ammar Abdulhamid  
Wassef is a special case among Syrian actresses and actors who are not 
fully supportive of the regime for her son is living in, and accused of 
being funded by, the United States of America. The son Ammar 
Abdulhamid (1966) introduces himself on his blog entitled “Syrian 
Revolution Digest” as a “liberal democracy activist whose anti-regime 
activities led to his exile from Syria on September 7, 2005.” He is the 
founder and director of the Tharwa Foundation, “a non-profit dedicated 
to democracy promotion.”25 Abdulhamid is an ex-fellow at the Saban 
Center and a current fellow at the Foundation for Defense of 
Democracies (FDD) both regarded to be pro-Israeli. When asked why he 
was allowed to leave the country and not jailed like other dissidents, he 
suspected that it was due to his mother Muna Wassef.26  
A published New York Times “encounter” with Abdulhamid 
confirms the three main accusations pro-regime activists use to attack 
Muna Wassef on various online forums. Wassef’s son is first, open to 
working with Israelis. Second, he has relations with the US government 
and has met “leading figures in the Bush administration” and third, he 
admires the US position and was “hoping to spend the next year 
explaining the American viewpoint to anyone in Damascus who would 
listen.”27 Tharwa’s two pages on Facebook have a total of 122 members 
or people who “like” it while his personal public figure page on 
Facebook has 215 people who like it.28 In the same magazine article, Jon 
Alterman from the Center for Strategic and International Studies in 
Washington considers liberals like Abdulhamid to be “too westernized 
to make an impact on the Arab masses.” With the changes in the region, 
Abdulhamid’s role is difficult to evaluate at the moment. He has 
contributed testimony to the Senate foreign relations committee.29 
Joshua Landis, author of “Syria Comment” newsletter and head of the 
Center for Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma, wrote on 
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29 March 2011 that Abdulhamid has “emerged as the ‘unofficial 
spokesman’ and most visible face of the Syrian Revolutionary 
movement” in the US.30 Irrespective of Abdulhamid’s actual influence 
on the dissident street or his impact on US foreign policy in regard to the 
Syrian government, his political activity puts him in a questionable 
position and makes his mother vulnerable to incitement.  
The Syrian regime’s rhetoric positions the Syrian state in 
confrontation with the United States and Israel, a political line dubbed 
“mumana’a” in Arabic which translates as “rejectionism,” “anti-
conspiracy” or “anti-imperialism” in contrast to the other camp of pro-
Western “moderates” such as Mubarak’s Egypt. This rhetoric 
emphasizes the neo-imperial US policies and disrespect of international 
law for example in regard to the occupation of Iraq, supporting Israel 
and interfering in Syria’s internal affairs. This same rhetoric potentially 
puts the state’s subjects in a polarized position of “patriots” versus 
“traitors.” It is beyond the scope of this paper to further analyse how the 
US “War on Terror,” Manichean policies and attitudes compare to the 
black and white representations the Syrian government uses vis-à-vis the 
US. However, emphasizing the dominance of such a discourse, which is 
interrelated with US foreign policies, might explain how allies or 
defenders of the US, like Abdulhamid, are made suspect. Wassef 
stressed that her son is against external military intervention in Syria.31 
In this case, she is speaking from within the discourse that renders those 
supportive of military intervention as “servants to the imperial 
hegemony.” Her son’s position during June 2011 allowed her to open a 
window within the local dominant rhetoric to argue that, “Abdulhamid is 
patriotic in his own way.” Her attempt at defending her son’s patriotism 
became more problematic after he called for military intervention in an 
interview with the Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth in December 
2011 entitled the “World should Bomb Syria” thus rendering him her 
weak spot.32  
Mother and Son: “Public” or “Private” 
The treason accusation campaign targeted the personal link portraying 
Wassef as responsible for her son’s politics as if disowning him would 
prove her loyalty to the country or regime. Wassef refused to choose 
between her son and her country. She stressed the fact that she is an 
independent entity with her own opinions and stances which she is able 
to take and defend without the influence of patriarchy, a son or a 
husband. Secondly, she refused to either defend or attack her son’s 
politics and put her relation with him outside her public life, back into 
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the private. “He has his way of loving the country and I have my reasons 
to be annoyed why they spoke.”33 While she did not specify who “they” 
were or “why” they spoke, she made it clear that the de-legitimization 
discourse targeted her public persona through her (private) blood ties to 
a dissident expatriate. Wassef became the victim of a triple-edged 
struggle for power, 1) an internal one with a dominant national discourse 
that defines patriotism as antagonistic to empire, 2) the U.S. and its 
interests in the region and 3) gender politics reflected in her position as a 
woman and a mother.  
Wassef the star has clear ideas about her career, roles and 
aspirations. She does not perceive herself as merely a wife or a mother. 
However, the view of women as wives or mothers persists and the 
accusations targeting Wassef cast her as a mother, either responsible for 
her son’s deeds, or under the authority of his political position. Wassef 
refused to be described as an annex to her son and emphasized her 
independence. She regarded motherhood to be a private business. 
Fleihan (the scriptwriter, author of the Call), on the other hand, used 
motherhood as an excuse to deemphasise an “irrational” act that 
stemmed from her emotional drive towards the children of Daraa. 
Fleihan was presumably forced to depoliticize her position, while on the 
other hand Wassef politicized her silence by choosing to stay away from 
the media after her television appearance.  
Wassef and Fleihan’s presence in the public domain forced them to 
tactically use notions of the “private’ and “public” to negotiate 
accusations of treason. While Wassef’s interest was to draw a strict 
border between the “private” and the “public”, Fleihan saw value in 
extending the “private” to the “public.” In the slightly different context 
of reality television shows viewed in Kuwait and Lebanon, Kraidy 
(2010) asks the relevant question of “why did women emerge as 
powerful and contested symbols?” (p.196). He concludes that in times of 
war women stars are vulnerable to “symbolic appropriation” especially 
when the nation is fragile and “feelings of belonging to imagined 
national communities” are heightened (p. 196). Times of conflict allow 
for “instances of women’s victimization as symbolic pawns of nations or 
as repositories of traditions;” meanwhile women are politically engaged, 
participating in demonstrations and in some cases confronting “self-
appointed custodians of tradition” (p. 197). This case study provides 
additional evidence of the centrality of gender in the study of power. 
Further analysis on how the accusation of treason is not only a means to 
discipline dissent but a mediated reflection of the problematic of 
nationhood, is part of my ongoing research on the construction and 
tension between regime, state and homeland discourses and loyalties.  
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Patriotism in Question  
One characteristic of stars, which they share with power elites, is their 
search for privacy in isolation from other groups in society (Alberoni 
1972, p.70). This “absence of mutuality” with audiences, who know the 
stars without the stars knowing them, leads to the construction of a star 
image. During the first part of the interview, Wassef described her 
deliberate choice of roles of strong women. As was stated above, she 
chose these roles because she needed to become strong herself, the roles 
reflected strength back on her. Later she infused her strength into the 
roles of weak women. While Wassef personified strength and power in 
roles where she confronted patriarchy and colonialism like that of Umm 
Joseph, she fell short of maintaining her established star image as the 
hero when she stressed in the interview that she was not what the 
protestors expected. 
The role of a hero in the non-fiction world, which Wassef did not 
play, was instead assumed by a young actress Fadwa Suleiman, who 
moved to Homs and lived in a rebellious neighbourhood leading 
demonstrations together with a local star football player.34 The case 
study of Suleiman and other actresses such as May Skaff are beyond the 
scope of this paper; however, they provide important material for further 
analysis and future research that aims to discuss the varied roles of stars 
during the Syrian uprising. The case of Wassef shows how a star who 
participated in supporting the demonstrations, by signing a Call that 
questioned whether children were infiltrators, did not enjoy the chance 
to have her charisma employed within the struggle to confront the state’s 
discourse on patriotism. Wassef’s charisma was managed through an 
accusation of treason campaign, which further led most stars to 
withdraw from the public debate. The majority of stars succumbed to 
being marginalised from the political scene unless they were regime 
supporters.  
Loyalists (TV presenters, television drama directors, cyberactivists, 
etc.) used the accusation of treason as a way to manage the position of 
stars who were attempting to employ their charisma to question or 
deconstruct the regime’s label of who is a patriot and who is a traitor. 
The regime’s grip over the definition of patriotism allowed loyalists to 
mobilize in this way. It is difficult to fully explain the various factors 
influencing the positions of stars accepting their public role to be 
constrained, including Wassef, nevertheless it is important to highlight a 
few comments. First, it is difficult to know without further research 
whether loyalty or compliance with the regime remains a result of its 
power or other factors including ideology and fear of insecurity resulting 
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from the threat of Lebanonization in Syria. Second, the division in the 
country between loyalists and opposition has not polarized the whole 
population and a large section of society remained silent, i.e. not 
publicly aligning with any side. Alberoni (1972) stresses that the status 
of stars is always “potentially revocable: by the public” (p.74). This 
complicates the argument, because artists might have been influenced by 
a desire to safeguard relations with audiences. Dissidents, on the other 
hand tried to redefine treason by raising the slogan: “a traitor is the one 
who kills his people,” something Hajj Saleh (2012) regards as a 
revolutionary definition that constitutes the basis for a new patriotism.35 
Among the silent majority are stars who express worry at accusations by 
dissidents suspecting stars still residing in Syria to be regime loyalists.36 
Amidst this instability challenging the regime and negotiating the Syrian 
state and nation, the symbolic power of a star like Muna Wassef did not 
translate into political power to participate in redefining the patriotic and 
contributing to political consensus.  
Conclusion 
Going back to the women’s protest chanting the name of a television 
character from a fictional story, the protestors in Damascus participated 
in the battle to define the patriotic by choosing to shout Umm Joseph. 
Umm Joseph as a symbol represented the action of Muna Wassef 
signing the Call and the narrative of Umm Joseph fighting the French. 
The use of this symbol by the protestors was a creative use of the 
institutional narrative against itself. Umm Joseph, the patriot according 
to the regime’s narrative, is also Wassef, the patriot according to 
protestors. Umm Joseph became the complex symbol contesting the 
official patriotism with the aim of redefining it. The official patriotic 
discourse claims to stand firm against foreign neo-imperial forces and 
advocates Asad’s personalization of power. Umm Joseph on the other 
hand defies the mandate, which is the historical counterpart of today’s 
neo-imperialism. She does that out of loyalty to Syria, the land, the 
imagined community, not the president.  
This paper is an attempt at demonstrating how conflicting accounts 
of patriotisms struggled in a mediated sphere of multiple players. 
Producers, famous directors, scriptwriters, journalists, actors and 
actresses acted through various media in order to make their cases heard. 
The national private and public television, pan Arab satellite television, 
Lebanese press, Facebook, websites and blogs were all spaces for 
blaming and defending, defaming and honouring. In this process Muna 
Wassef, by signing the Call, made herself liable to become a contested 
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site in the battle for power. By fighting patriarchy and colonialism in her 
fictional roles, Wassef was asked by the public and forbidden by the 
power elites to play a role that would generalize her charisma. While she 
took a political position to withdraw from the public sphere after the 
televised appearance following the Call, one group of women protesting 
used her fictional role as a symbol to fight the Syrian regime’s definition 
of patriotism. To question the workings of treason and loyalty in the 
case of Muna Wassef is part of a continuous project that sheds light on 
the challenges of mediatised practices in a decolonial state living 
through conflict and transition that is threatening its existence.
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of the Advisory Committee  
about the Internal Situation on the 
Verge of the Second Decade of the 
Leadership of your Excellency1 
Mr President, 
Introduction:  
By the summer of 2010 Syria will have completed its first decade under 
the leadership of President Bashar al-Asad. This occasion is marked by 
the preparations for the National Conference of the Bath Party, that will 
be preceded or followed by the formation of a new government, as well 
as the end of the Tenth Five Year Plan, and the preparation and adoption 
of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan.  
During the past ten years, Syria has faced many difficult conditions 
on the foreign policy front which it managed with great success thanks 
to the leadership of Mr. President.  
While some belligerent forces bet on the failure of the Syrian 
leadership to deal with these challenges, facts have proven that Syria has 
been successful and effective in overcoming such difficulties. The 
attempts to isolate Syria have failed and Syria has proven again to be an 
indispensable actor in any attempt to find solutions to the problems of 
the region.  
But unlike the successes in foreign policy, to which Mr President 
has given his utmost interest due to its urgency and sensitivity, the 
management of the domestic situation at the political and economic 
levels, which are charged to the executive administration as well as to 
other state institutions, has not achieved the same level of success. This 
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has led to achievements on the external front and weakened the capacity 
of the state on the domestic front.  
Domestic policy faced a number of difficulties that have escalated, 
by neglect and mismanagement, into a socio-economic crisis. This has 
resulted in a great deal of dissatisfaction among the citizens as well as 
the elite.  
1 - Executive Summary:  
• The first ten years of leadership of the President were marked by a 
broad shift in Syria's economic and political environment, and, 
to some extent, in the overall direction of its internal policy.  
• Mr President set out, for the first time, the outlines of this change 
in his speech in July 2000 which has been reaffirmed in 
subsequent speeches, especially in the second inaugural speech 
in July 2007.  
At the level of the structure of governance of the state:  
• The structure of the Syrian state was formed in the 1960s and 
the 1970s, influenced by the Soviet model.  
• This structure also fulfilled a historic role, but started to become 
obsolete causing an increased weakening in the role of these 
institutions (i.e. the party, the [National Progressive] Front, 
legislative power, the judiciary, the executive, mass 
organizations, business organizations and the role of different 
social factions and classes). 
• Currently there are real questions about the centre of decision-
making in Syria. 
• At the level of state institutions, a major degradation of their 
role has been due to their failure in coping with drastic changes, 
rendering impossible, sometimes, the fulfilment of their 
function. 
• Similarly at the level of administrative performance, which has 
witnessed a drastic deterioration of its functions, there has been 
a sclerosis or decrease in productivity, characterised by poor 
efficiency, low performance, and corruption.  
• Perhaps the root of many of Syria's internal problems lies in the 
weakness and the sharp fall in administrative performance at the 
level of the executive (owing to bureaucracy, a lack of 
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accountability and corruption) as well as at the level of 
municipal and local state institutions. 
• The main problem resides in the fact that these institutions are 
the very tools which are supposed to lead development and 
modernization.  
• This has led in its turn to a fundamental weakness in the 
mobilizing capacity of the socio-political system. It has led as 
well to the paralysis of the state in its capability of managing 
the domestic file. 
• Subsequently there is an urgent need to redefine the 
roles and structure of these institutions, either at the ver-
tical or horizontal level.  
On the economic front: 
• Syria began the transition from a socialist planned 
totalitarian economy with all its known characteristics some 
time ago.  
• While a socialist economy fulfilled a historical role, it was 
no longer able to promote economic and social 
development.  
• In addition, change was needed to cope with the 
international pressure Syria was facing in the context of a 
radical neo-liberal wave of globalization.  
• Syria has shifted towards a market economy taking into 
account the political, economic, historic and cultural 
transformation that this entails. 
• The Syrian route to a social market economy, however, has 
not simply conformed to an imported prefabricated 
prescription. It was perceived that reform could take many 
forms and tracks which have subsequently led to very 
different economic and social results.  
• It is important to note that the Syrian institutions did not 
have any prior experience in dealing with or tackling a 
market economy.  
• Moreover, Syria has embarked on the process of self-
transformation without any assistance or support, but has 
been subjected, instead, to increasing external pressures. 
This has added new difficulties to the intrinsic problems of 
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the transition itself, and has had negative implications in the 
shaping of economic, social and political developments. 
• Therefore executive steps for policy reform, development 
and transition to a market-based economy in the recent past 
have taken a very selective approach.  
• These steps were intentionally slowed down to avoid the 
risk of acceleration and destabilization in an atmosphere of 
a lack of experience and the exposure to external pressures. 
• However, while this approach has resulted in some positive 
results, it has also had some negative consequences or 
effects that will impact on the shaping of future economic 
and social developments.  
• This approach has not been balanced in terms of 
productivity, as it has focused on the liberalization of rent 
and financial sectors (cash, money and trade) and neglected 
productive sectors generating added value and employment 
opportunities (agriculture, industry, transport, tourism, 
construction, etc.). 
• Subsequently, there have been some signs of social 
imbalance, where the support and protection provided by 
the state to the less fortunate classes has been reduced, 
while it has not been able to compensate for the regression 
of the role of the state as a welfare safety network. 
• On the other hand, the Syrian private sector has 
demonstrated a lack of social responsibility and, at the same 
time, suffers from structural deficits that render it incapable 
of replacing the role of the state vis-à-vis the workers. 
Subsequently the private sector has been unable to fill the 
vacuum created by the retreat of the state  
• The failure of the media sector in reaching the grass roots 
of the society and appealing to common sense in promoting 
the program of the president among the people has meant 
that most people only are seeing the regression of social 
support and the raising of prices. It seems to many that the 
state is abandoning the poor for the sake of the rich. 
• The negative economic effects have started to show. The 
volume of imports has surpassed exports, and the trade 
deficit has begun to grow which has had a heavy impact on 
industry and other sectors. 
• Furthermore, the negative results of this policy are apparent 
in the decrease in living standards and increased poverty 
rates. Figures in 2009 were higher than in 2004.  
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• Parallel to this, a drastic collapse in health services, 
education and transport has continued, in addition to 
growing corruption and bureaucracy, which have made 
people’s quality of life unbearable. 
• Some officials have said "that this is the price of reform, 
and this price must be paid.” This justification has its risks, 
especially in a country like Syria which is exposed to 
various pressures, because the people may answer: "Those 
who are making money should pay the costs [of economic 
reforms]” and those who are making money are seen to be 
the government’s clients. It is of utmost necessity to 
reconsider the recent economic policy and its outcomes in 
order to create a balanced productive economy and society. 
• Recent economic steps have been characterized by a 
specific neo-liberal market economy, while what is required 
is to apply "a Syrian edition of the social market economy", 
which forms the core vision of the presidency.  
Society:  
• Society is becoming characterised by the emergence of an 
increasing social polarization. 
• Cultural polarization is also becoming evident. 
• There has been a decline in the principles of nationalism, 
secularism and liberal ideology. 
• This has been coupled with a decline in the role of the state 
in social and communal management. 
• This has subsequently provided an open field for Salafist 
forces.  
• Institutions based on pre-citizenship solidarities and 
primordial loyalties such as clans, tribes, ethnic and 
confessional groups have become more entrenched, and at 
the expense of national citizenship affiliation. 
In conclusion: 
• We have a young President but outmoded tools for 
development and modernization.  
• We need new locomotives towing economic and social 
development  
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• Now, a decade after the arrival of the President to power, 
sufficient experience has been gained which is necessary to 
reconsider the path to modernisation.  
• In order to develop this approach and move forward to the 
next period and prepare for the coming years ahead of Mr 
President, it is important to draw from the experiences of 
the past decade and to highlight the need for an overview of 
what has been achieved and what has not yet been 
achieved.  
An aging state build-up and aging modes of management:  
Four decades have passed since the corrective movement in which the 
basis and institutions of the modern Syrian state were established. This 
structure and the role of the entailing institutions have been affected to a 
large extent by the experience of relations with the former Soviet Union, 
politically, economically and socially.  
Despite the significant developments that have taken place 
internally, regionally and internationally, the structure of the state has 
remained the same, where different state actors continue to play the 
same role. Any reform requires structural changes in the institutions and 
roles.  
Ideas, ideologies, organizations and ways of thinking are born, grow 
strong, then gradually get old and require renewal.  
This fact has created an imbalance on two levels: The first level: 
The overall structure of state institutions and the rules. And at the 
second level: of administrative performance of those various 
institutions.  
The first level: due to great developments, the role of many 
institutions has changed in practice by virtue of natural development or 
due to a change in function and changes on the socio-economic 
structures.  
The effectiveness of the Baath Party has been extensively weakened 
and it has practically lost its leadership role both in terms of rallying the 
people around the policies of the party or through auditing the state 
institutions. The Front parties have only had a negligible role, while the 
weakness of political life and activity in the community is the reason 
behind the reluctance of most people to participate in the process of 
modernization and development.  
Subsequently, the role of national, secular and liberal forces has 
regressed. On the other hand, the domestic arena has been left to Salafist 
forces preaching their ideology in the guise of religion. Its power and 
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influence have increased within the community and is still growing 
strongly.  
Meanwhile the municipal and local authorities have further been 
weakened at the level of grassroots and their role has not been renewed 
or substituted. Political and social competition for the leadership in those 
institutions has become completely absent. Absent as well are electoral 
programs and electoral auditing. This in turn has rendered institutions 
such as parliament and municipalities, local councils, trade unions, 
peasant organizations, women’s groups, youth or student societies and 
the state media so weak that they have become a burden on the state 
instead of helping in the communication between the society and the 
state. Consequently, the capacity of these social instruments to curb and 
mend social and economic contradictions and conflict has been eroded.  
The same goes for the performance of the executive branches of the 
bureaucracy. In turn, this has led to a lack of confidence of the citizens 
and to the decline in the role of these institutions as a major component 
of the safety network in the community. Such a decline has also 
impacted on the security services and their ability to deal with the 
society with tools other than violence. 
Because of these aging institutions and the lack of clarity in their 
role, many questions have been raised within Syria and abroad about 
where the decision making and management of domestic issues is done. 
Is it at the level of the regional command, the government or the office 
of the President?  
Many thinkers and researchers agree on the importance of this 
question. While many officials point their fingers at the President asking 
him to take responsibility, the President himself has always insisted on 
the need to empower the state and its institutions.  
The need for these institutions (the party, youth organisations, the 
National Progressive Front, government institutions, trade unions and 
other mass organizations, the media, education institutions, etc.) is more 
important today and in the future than it used to be in the past. They are 
the management tools at the domestic level. The efficiency and 
effectiveness of these (soft power) tools is of a vital importance, not 
only in raising the efficiency of the community, developing the Syrian 
state, and in helping to shape the Syrian reform, but also in helping the 
implementation of political, economic, social and cultural rights, and to 
strengthen the domestic resolve. 
It should be noted that the potential use of hard power (police, 
security and military) in managing social problems is limited and risks 
inciting an international intervention in the internal affairs of the Syria 
state.  
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Hence, this requires a reconsideration of the roles of these 
organizations that constitute the basis of the state to suit the 
requirements of the future and the new vision for the country that makes 
Syria a model in all fields at both the Arab and regional levels.  
The second level: relates to performance of the administrative body 
which suffers from regression, low efficiency, poor performance, low 
productivity and corruption. Perhaps the root of many of Syria's internal 
problems lies in the weakness of the capacities of the government and 
ministries in addition to different state institutions to manage the 
domestic issues and to address the economic and social challenges.  
The ministries have kept their old habits, without daring to take any 
decisions, preferring to evade responsibility, waiting, as they say, for 
instructions from above.  
A further weakness resides in the lack of clarity and poor decision-
making mechanisms, as well as in the weak management, 
implementation and follow-up of the ministries. These institutions 
support the old ineffective system of wages and recompenses, repelling 
every talent, failing to reward production and achievements, and lack 
objective criteria for the promotion of medium and higher elite. They 
also lack punishment and reward policies, and have widened the circle 
of corruption in the absence of any auditing system.  
In sum, these defects clearly highlight many aspects of the 
weaknesses of different state institutions, without exception. 
Experience has shown in the past decade that these institutions, that 
should have been the main tools of reform and modernization, have not 
been able to develop ideas and implement them into practice, whether 
they are institutions from the National Front or the parties, government 
bodies, state institutions, trade unions and other mass organizations they 
have all lost their effectiveness. This has hit all of society.  
Thus, the previous momentum inherited from the 1960s and 1970s, 
has slowed down due to objective factors, and must be replaced with 
new forces produced by new engines of change to generate the speed 
and power required for the new phase to come.  
This will only be achieved by redrawing the roles of these 
institutions as engines for reform to make them strong enough to realize 
the vision of reform and development for the shaping of a modern, 
strong and prosperous Syria.  
2 - An imbalance in the economic approach:  
There is no doubt that the steps of economic reform towards a market 
economy have achieved some positive results which would not have 
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been possible without this reform. This was based on encouraging the 
private sector and to incorporate the tens of thousands of Syrians 
entrepreneurs in productive economic activity. It has, also, attracted 
capital to Syria.  
Much of this capital was capital that had been transferred abroad but 
it also included Arab and foreign investments that have created 
productive capacities and employment opportunities, improved the 
business climate, improved the legislative, regulatory structure, and 
improved Syrian experience in dealing with the international market.  
Some private industries have been established and some have shown 
exports capacity. They have led to the improvement of tourism and of 
Syrian international economic relations, especially within the Arab arena 
as well as with Turkey.  
It has been possible subsequently to keep a relatively strong Syrian 
currency, and the budget deficit under control and external indebtedness 
low. It would not have been possible to achieve what has been achieved 
if Syria had continued its previous approach.  
However, the market economy – without submitting Syria to a 
single prefabricated model – can take many forms with quite different 
economic and social results.  
On one hand, Syrian institutions do not have the necessary 
experience in the market economy, on the other, the political conditions 
imposed on Syria meant that Syria has had to pursue its self-
transformation without assistance and without any support.  
Instead of receiving help and support Syria has faced external 
threats and challenges. This has added new difficulties to the transition 
itself, which have implications on the social and political spheres.  
Although the government’s plans for reforms were outlined for the 
first time in the Presidential speech in July 2000 and reaffirmed in later 
speeches, especially in the second inaugural speech in July 2007, the 
policy of reform and development and the transition to a market-based 
economy afterward has taken an experimental approach.  
For many reasons, an integrated, clearly defined strategy has not 
been pursued. Such an integrated approach is however necessary as 
directives for the reform of various institutions indicated in the state 
plan.  
The slow pace of reform was meant to avoid the risk of accelerating 
an uncontrolled reform process under conditions of a lack of experience 
and exposure to pressure. However, this experimental approach, which 
could have been justified, has resulted in some negative impact.  
The new economic approach, for more than one reason, has not 
fulfilled the promises on many levels, and it has been unable to maintain 
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and defend the benefits of the social safety network for the public. This 
is an important factor in preserving a sense of social satisfaction and 
loyalty for a wide range of the population. Instead, it has created 
dissatisfaction in many fields. It seems to us, that there is a need to 
address the reform in the processes of decision making.  
The reason for this difficulty is due to the lack of definite orientation 
towards a social market economy. The currently chosen track for reform 
simply ignores the needs of the less fortunate classes in our society, in 
spite of the fact that there are many other forms of reform and many 
alternatives which could differ in their socio-economic outcome.  
We think that the Tenth Five Year Plan has failed to achieve its 
objectives at an acceptable level. It has failed to control the high rate of 
population growth, failed to promote the job creation, and failed to 
tackle unemployment, despite some improvement. Subsequently Syria 
has not benefited from the oil boom in the region, which lasted from 
2004 to 2008, and has not attracted sufficient investment.  
Prices are soaring and have not been coupled with an increase in 
wages since 2006. Furthermore we must highlight the deficit in the trade 
balance in the global budget which is doomed to further increase with 
the decline in oil production.  
The trade balance deficit for commodity for the year 2009 amounts 
to about 130 billion Syrian pounds (720 billion exports against 850 
billion in imports), while the value of the state reserve of hard currency 
has declined, and agricultural production, which is still at the mercy of 
rains due to the failure in the plans for the transition to a modern 
irrigation system is also in decline. On the other side, industry in its turn 
is experiencing the pressures of the liberalization of imports.  
On top of all these difficulties is the global financial crisis which has 
created additional pressure on the economic performance, investment, 
exports and unemployment.  
Furthermore, the decline in social services, the shortage in 
electricity, the increasing numbers of people with no access to potable 
water, and the continued transport crisis all over the country have 
exacerbated popular disaffection. This has been compounded by the 
decline in health services and public hospitals infected by sluggishness 
and corruption, the extremely overcrowded public universities, the rise 
in organized crime and corruption, which remains widespread without 
any level of auditing or follow-up. .  
A significant example of this is in the processing of the diesel 
problem as a clear case that shows the inefficiency of the state 
administration in dealing with domestic issues. This is damaging the 
reputation of the state among the citizens.  
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The current edition of the market-based economy seems to be 
unbalanced and far from favouring production, it does not enhance the 
productivity capacity of the economy. The cabinet has tried to promote a 
market economy through liberalizing the finance and trade sectors. 
These sectors live on the productive sectors rather than being themselves 
productive in comparison with other areas of the economy producing 
real added value and income as well as jobs (such as industry, 
agriculture, transportation, construction amongst others). 
Competitiveness and liberalization have not been implemented in these 
productive sectors.  
In fact, the programs for the reform of the productive sectors have 
not been translated into reality at any level. This is reflected in our 
assessment of the Tenth Five-Year Plan.  
Further, the pace of trade liberalization has been harmful to the 
productive sectors, such as industry. This seems to be an approach based 
on the recommendations of the International Monetary Fund, which is a 
recipe with known results at the social and economic level. In contrast, 
experiences in Japan and the Asian Tigers, and more recently in China, 
India and Brazil have shown they focused on the development of their 
productive sectors (especially industry) and the formulation of fiscal and 
monetary policies and trade in favour of the growth of productive 
sectors.  
The private sector in Syria has for the most part not flourished and 
matured yet. It does not recognize its ethical, social and national 
responsibilities either in terms of implementing the new modes of 
production or fulfilling its social obligations.  
The private sector does not comply with its moral and social 
responsibilities which guide the business sectors in developed countries. 
Its commitment to the rule of law is very weak, it continues to evade 
taxes and to avoid payment of customs duties and social security duties 
through bribes. It does not care about the environment or for workers’ 
rights, and pays no attention to improving the working conditions or the 
conditions of residence of workers and their families. Nor does it 
understand the importance of the company as a social institution, rather 
than being the property of an individual acting out his desires.  
The private sector does not contribute to the projects of private 
welfare, such as the granting of scholarships for students, the 
establishment of health centres and the support of sports, as well as 
cultural and artistic activities. It does not care for people with special 
needs or of scientific research. All these functions could be shared with 
the responsibility of the state.  
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Furthermore, the overall economic policy applied in favour of 
traders at the expense of industrialists has led many of them to shift from 
productive activities to commercial activities and rent. This has been at 
the expense of the productive capacity of the Syrian economy.  
On the other hand, the state treasury has lost a lot of its capacity and 
resources, due to lower rents and the decline in both the oil surplus and 
foreign aid. Unless the government works hard to offset taxes, there 
could be no solution to the problem of the lack of revenue. The problem 
of low tax revenue from the private sector is crucial as the majority of 
Treasury revenues from taxes come from the oil or the public sector.  
Tax evasion is still widespread, despite the significant reductions 
made to the tax rates, to the extent that they have become less than the 
rate of taxes in major capitalist countries.  
The government has not made any efforts to combat smuggling and 
customs evasion, which drains the state treasury of large sums.  
The government has not taken the initiative in over ten years to 
reform the public sector so as to get rid of losses in public enterprises 
either in the so-called non-strategic or strategic installations. Nothing 
has been done to repair and rehabilitate the facilities and to restore 
competitiveness, or to allow financial and administrative independence 
and flexibility in those firms. This decline has led to a further reduction 
the income from the public sector.  
This situation has weakened the ability of the public treasury and 
therefore the state, to continue playing its role, to bear the same burdens. 
It has led to a decline in its ability to implement reform.  
An increasing concentration of power in the hands of the crony 
bureaucracy classes is notable, while the popular classes have lost 
power.  
In other countries where a market economy has been applied, great 
importance is given to the balance in society, in order to maintain social 
stability (between the power of state institutions, business organizations 
and workers in trade unions)  
Such a phenomenon has its risks, especially in a country like Syria, 
which is exposed to various pressures. The need to ensure the loyalty of 
the population is of utmost importance.  
The social contract allowing the Baath party to apply the principle 
of a balance of classes, and to neutralize the resistance of feudalism and 
capital is based on the alliance between the workers, peasants, small 
income earners and educated revolutionaries, as well as the promotion 
and development of the public sector. Also important was the ownership 
of small and medium enterprises, the redistribution of territory of large 
landowners to farmers, taking into account the interests of the producing 
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classes, the most vulnerable in the community, and the expansion of free 
education in the depths of the countryside and the poor neighbourhoods.  
This led to the creation of social mobility and broadly enabled large 
groups of the vulnerable in rural and urban areas to climb the social 
ladder and to access vital positions in the state and society (among them 
educated groups, senior government officials, university professors, 
engineers, doctors, officers, leaders, and others).  
This created a strong loyalty to the Baath regime between these 
broad categories in addition to the peasantry and workers.  
This was reflected during the confrontations with the Muslim 
Brotherhood as well as in the mass mobilization for the October 
Liberation War, the intervention in Lebanon to end the civil war and the 
failure of the Israeli invasion.  
The decomposition of the social safety network is however evident 
in the abolition of the protection of rented houses, the abolition of the 
protection of peasant land, the elimination of worker rights, the 
reduction of subsidized prices, the freezing of wages and the halt on the 
expansion of the public sector which have all prevented the reform from 
creating alternative institutions to compensate for the damage caused to 
the most vulnerable sectors in society. 
The private sector has not succeeded in creating tangible benefits or 
provided solutions to these problems. It has not been able to create 
enough jobs to absorb new entrants into the labour market or protect 
workers. It has been unable to develop large industrial sectors or to pay 
higher wages. It is not interested in its social duties. This has given the 
impression to the poorer classes that the state "is giving up its historical 
alliances and is biased in favour of the rich at the expense of the poor". 
These poorer social classes have been and will remain a key bloc of 
citizens whose support is important in this transformation. The current 
policy is narrowing the base of the regime and makes the system unable 
to activate these classes when they are needed in the internal and 
external confrontations.  
If we add this to the decline in state capacity and the lack of 
willingness to support free education, medical care and subsidies, this 
will lead to further polarization of the community, something which 
threatens social stability. This will also lead to the erosion of the middle 
class and reverse its role as a dynamo in the society.  
If we add this polarization to the cultural polarization, the risks 
appear doubled. The Syrian community is witnessing the growth of 
cultural division, including those among youth groups. In light of the 
significant decline of the identity and ideology of the state, and the 
Baath Party as a secular nationalist party, more and more splits will 
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occur. The community will be torn apart between the Salafist groups and 
the forces of modernization. This division is further amplified by the 
new cyberspace. With the growing sentiments of tribalism and 
sectarianism the new generation is fragmented and desperate.  
Conclusions  
The past ten years have witnessed successes in the management of 
foreign policy but have not been matched by similar success in the 
management of internal files. This is due to the weakness in the 
development of state tools, the erosion in the role of traditional 
institutions and the weakness in the capacity of government and state 
institutions.  
The situation can be summarized as: an ambitious young President, 
a rising young generation with immense needs, difficult domestic and 
international conditions, and a continuing failure of the tools of state for 
the efficient implementation of reform. This requires a comprehensive 
vision for the present and for the future to create an effective mechanism 
to cope with the aspirations of the leadership. The time is right, as 
foreign policy success gives the opportunity to focus on the internal 
situation.
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